Liberal “chefs de cabinets ministeriels” in Quebec: keeping politics in policy-making

Abstract: During the Parti Québécois tenure of office, relations between chiefs of staff and senior officials were frequently characterized by conflict. By contrast, current Liberal chiefs of staff have managed to establish harmonious relations with senior officials. These different relations are explained by comparing the social origins, career paths and ideological inclinations of Péquiste chiefs of staff with those of their Liberal successors. The social origins of the two groups are of little significance in explaining their different relations with senior officials. However, the para-public service experiences of Péquiste chiefs of staff and their interventionist-oriented ideological inclinations largely account for the tension and conflict which tended to characterize their relations with senior officials. The public service experiences and non-interventionist predispositions of Liberal chiefs of staff have largely been responsible for their co-operative relations with senior officials. In the final analysis, the professional experiences and ideological inclinations of Liberal chiefs of staff have enabled them to acquire a clear understanding of the functions of their office. Moreover, these experiences and inclinations have shaped their determination to separate the political from the technical aspects of policy-making in order to maintain harmonious relations and to enhance their ministers' control over the politics of policy-making. Sommaire: Pendant le mandat du Parti québécois, les directeurs de cabinet et les hauts fonctionnaires ont souvent entretenus des relations conflictuelles. En revanche, sous le gouvernenient libéral actuel, les directeurs de cabinet ont réussi à nouer des rapports harmonieux avec les hauts fonctionnaires. Cette différence s'explique en comparant l'origine sociale, la carrière et l'orientation idéologique des directeurs de cabinet péquistes à ceux de leurs successeurs libéraux. Les origines sociales des deux groupes ne constituent pas un facteur d'explication important. En revanche, les activités parapubliques des directeurs de cabinet péquistes et leur tendance à préconiser une politique d'intervention ont joué un rôle-clé dans les relations tendues et conflictuelles qu'ils avaient avec les hauts fonctionnaires. Les directeurs de cabinet libéraux, au contraire, ayant travaillé dans le secteur public et favorisant une politique non interventionniste, ont des relations marquées par la collaboration avec les hauts fonctionnaires. Finalement, l'auteur de l'article explique que les expériences professionnelles et les orientations idéologiques des directeurs de cabinet libéraux ont permis à ces derniers de bien comprendre leurs fonctions. De plus, ces expériences et ces orientations les ont poussés à séparer les aspets politiques des aspects techniques lorsqu'il s'agit de prendre des décisions de façon à maintenir de bonnes relations et à accroître le contrôle qu'exercent leurs ministres sur les aspets politiques de la prise de décisions.     

The discourse of democracy in Canadian nuclear waste management policy

Canadian nuclear waste management policy has taken a deliberative democratic turn. What explains this turn? What is its significance? What lessons does it teach us? I trace a narrative of a powerful discursive coalition that was able to take advantage of institutional and financial opportunities to advance deliberative democratic decision making. I identify limitations in this turn by evaluating the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s subsequent consultation process against the criteria of inclusion, equality, reciprocity, agreement, and integration. Despite impressive deliberative democratic designs, the process falls short of each criterion. This analysis clarifies the relative importance of actors to coalitions and institutions. Even with a strong coalition and favorable institutional context, realizing deliberative democracy is contingent on the will of involved actors. This conclusion has implications for the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.     

Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997

Buchanan and Tullock (1962) demonstrates that supermajority rules can reduce tyranny of majority problems in a democracy. However, recent theoretical work by Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) postulates that this static analysis of supermajority rules may be inadequate to explain political decisions in a dynamic setting. In fact, supermajority rules may increase the incidence of majority tyranny because of rotating political representation. Using data from US state legislatures we examine the effect of supermajority rules on different categories of government expenditures and tax revenues during the latter half of the 20th century. We find supermajority rules have little effect on general government expenditures and tax revenues. However, supermajority rules are associated with lower public welfare transfers, which supports the traditional analysis of the fiscal effects of supermajority rules.     

Assessing the Impact of Microcredit: A Zambian Case Study

Expectations are high, but evidence of the impact of microcredit remains in short supply. This article estimates the impact of an urban credit programme in Zambia on business performance and on a range of indicators of wellbeing. Borrowers who obtained a second loan experienced significantly higher average growth in business profits and household income. Inflexible group enforcement of loan obligations resulted in some borrowers, especially amongst those who had taken only one loan, being made worse off. Our methodological investigations suggest that the supply of rigorous impact studies can be increased by basing them on data collection that serves a wider range of purposes, including market research.     

Pussy Riot as a feminist project: Russia's gendered informal politics

This article considers Pussy Riot as a feminist project, placing their actions and the regime's reactions in the context of three post-9/11 developments in gender and sexuality politics in Russia. First, I assert that Pussy Riot's stunts are a logical reaction to the Kremlin's masculinity-based nation-rebuilding scheme, which was a cover for crude homophobic misogyny. Second, Pussy Riot is part of the informal feminism emerging in Russia, a response to nongovernmental organization (NGO) feminism and the regime's repression of NGO feminism, albeit likely to be outflanked by regime-supported thuggery. Third, the members of Pussy Riot were so harshly prosecuted because they – swearing, covered up and disloyal – violated the political cleaner role that the Kremlin has given women in the last few years. Feminist social scientists have long looked for politics outside of formal institutions and processes. The Pussy Riot affair makes clear how much gender is central to the informal politics that gender-blind observers of Russia have come to see as crucial to understanding Russia's regime.