Federal Reimbursement for Mandates on State and Local Governments

One of the remedies sought by state and local officials for the growing burden of federal mandates is a mandate reimbursement law. A major purpose of mandate reimbursement is to deter Congress from imposing excessive costs on state and local governments by making it fully accountable for its actions. The paper begins by extending the economic theory of grants to mandates and reimbursed mandates. It goes on to assess the benefits and costs of mandate reimbursement, and to distinguish mandates that should be reimbursed, should a reimbursement program prove desirable, from those that should not. Then, using the economic theory of grants and mandates, the paper compares reimbursed mandates with two alternatives for accomplishing the same objective, compensating grants and procedural rules. It concludes that the latter are more promising than mandate reimbursement.     

DOES ECONOMICS PROVIDE A RELIABLE GUIDE TO REGULATING COMMODITY BUNDLING BY FIRMS? A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

This article surveys the voluminous economic literature on commoditybundling. While bundling has been widely studied, the vast majorityof the literature has focused on theoretical treatments of bundlingthat demonstrate a wide range of reasons why firms might engagein bundling. These papers generally contain restrictive assumptions,including assumptions regarding the existence of monopoly insome markets, and the nature of rivalry in others. The modelscontained in these papers also generally suppress the more obviousand ubiquitous reasons firms may use bundling. Moreover, thesemodels have not been subject to robustness checks, nor havetheir assumptions been tested empirically. This review of theeconomic literature generally confirms the US Solicitor General'sview in 3M v. LePage's regarding the underdeveloped state ofthe economics literature and its position that the US SupremeCourt should defer promulgation of antitrust standards for bundling.While the literature has demonstrated the possibility that bundlingcan generate anticompetitive harm, it does not provide a reliableway to gauge whether the potential for harm would outweigh anydemonstrable benefits from the practice. As a result, the widespreadapplication of the antitrust laws to bundling by firms can generatesignificant error costs by erroneously condemning or deterringefficient business practices. In the future, economists shouldseek to expand their understanding of both the anticompetitiveand procompetitive reasons firms engage in bundling. This willentail studying the reasons why bundling is adopted by firmswithout market power, relaxing the assumption of monopoly intheoretical models, and generating testable hypotheses and thedata to test them.     

ECJ allows service marks for retail trade and tells Nestle it can 'HAVE A BREAK' without having a Kit Kat

In response to a reference from the UK Court of Appeal, undertrade mark Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988, the ECJdetermined that distinctive character may be acquired throughuse as part of an already registered trade mark.     

Rape,burglary, and opportunity

Following on the recent development of opportunity theory in criminology, we apply an opportunity approach to rape. Although rape is commonly viewed as a street crime, a substantial proportion of rape occurs inside homes following an unlawful entry of the residence. Drawing on this observation, we argue that rape and burglary, because they share a common locus in the home, should exhibit similar opportunity structures. That is, characteristics that place particular types of homes and householders at greater risk of burglary should also place (female) residents at greater risk of rape. An analysis of UCR rates and censusderived opportunity variables for 155 SMSAs in 1980 supports this position. We conclude that home-intrusion rape (rape following an unlawful entry of the home) is a violent crime with the opportunity structure of a property crime.     

Reviews

Recently, various authors have examined the relationship between growth in government size and total economic growth. In each case, the authors permitted only a monotonic relationship. This paper examines the issue of a non-linear relationship between growth in government and overall growth in the economy.Government contributes to total economic output in various ways. The provision of Pigovian public goods enhances the productivity of the private sector inputs increasing total output. However, the public decision-making process can result in an inefficient quantity of public goods. The likelihood of this outcome increases with the size of government. Further negative effects are created by the revenue raising and spending mechanisms of government, and the increasing diversion of resources into unproductive rent-seeking activities. The magnitude of these effects is likely to increase with the relative size of government.     

Do Śrāvakas understand emptiness?

Conclusions The present study has attempted to artriculate a central issue of Mahäyäna soteriology through an examination of the writings of two Mädhyamika masters, Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti. The purpose here has been to demonstrate a further criterion for the retrospective designation of their respective philosophies with the terms Svtantrika and Prasangika an exhaustive study of the nature of the Hinayäna wisdom according to the Mädhyamika school would entail an analysis of the writings of many other masters, especially those who produced what has been called the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika synthesis. To attempt to determine the position of Maitreyanätha, for example, on this issue would entail an analysis of the famous Five Treatises (the Dharmadharmatävibhaa, the Madhyäntavibhaga, the Mahayanasutrlamkara, the Uttratantra, and the Abhisamayälamkära) as well as the myriad commentaries on these works. It is possible to speculate briefly here on what the position of Nägärjuna may have been on this issue and then go on to discuss the implications and possible motivations of the views of Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti.