Limited Liability in California 1928-31: It's the Lawyers

Only in 1931 was the California Corporate Code revised to providefor limited liability. In earlier work I found that this movehad no detectable effect on shareholder wealth. In this articleI examine the potential beneficiaries of this change with aneye toward finding out who wanted this change. Using this historicalexample we can shed light on a number of issues including: (1)the economic impact of limited liability; (2) the role of lawyers,especially lawyers of high prestige, in determining the law;and (3) the competition or lack thereof among states in designingtheir corporate codes.     

Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code

In this article we introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter's operational code. Using speeches from the public record, we construct indices for the elements of the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches, President Jimmy Carter's views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. We find that Carter's view of the political universe and approach to political action were consistent across issue areas during the first three years of his term as president. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan President Carter's support for human rights remained steadfast. Statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and in his approach to political action regarding the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations and other issues.     

Measuring the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents: A proposed (extremely simple) method

Several observations can be made concerning the data presented in the preceding tables. First, as one might expect, not all Democratic or Republican presidents are alike. As shown in Table 3, John Kennedy has a higher cumulative pro-ADA rating than does Lyndon Johnson than does Jimmy Carter. On the Republican side, Dwight Eisenhower comes in at roughly the middle of the ADA liberal/conservative ideological spectrum and considerably to the left of both Ronald Reagan and George Bush.Second, while there appear to be significant differences between the ideological preferences of presidents from the same party, the correlation between a president's annual or cumulative pro-ADA percentage and a dummy variable reflecting the party of the president (Democrats equal unity, Republicans equal zero) is still fairly high. For example, the correlation between the nine post-World War II presidents' cumulative pro-ADA percentages (Table 3) and a party dummy variable is 0.93. The correlation between presidents' annual pro-ADA percentages (Table 2) and a party dummy variable is 0.87. Thus, while a dummy variable reflecting the party of a president may not be the most preferred measure of presidents' ideological preferences, such a variable may be a reasonably accurate substitute for the pro-ADA percentages reported in Tables 2 and 3.