Al Qaeda,Deterrence, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

This article takes issue with the frequently-made assertion that Al Qaeda cannot be deterred from employing weapons of mass destruction. It argues that Al Qaeda's leadership employs terroristic violence in a manner calculated to achieve a set of political goals. They are, in other words, rational actors who are sensitive to the potential costs and benefits associated with their actions, and thus are to some extent deterrable. The article examines a number of ways in which the lack of discrimination and proportionality associated with weapons of mass destruction might be expected to produce more problems than benefits for Al Qaeda and thus deter their use. It also considers some ways in which the West might seek to bolster these deterrent effects.     

The 1945 Ethridge Mission to Bulgaria and Romania and the Origins of the Cold War in the Balkans

In autumn 1945, US Secretary of State James Byrnes deadlocked with Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov over the governments of Bulgaria and Romania. To escape, Byrnes dispatched Mark Ethridge, a liberal newspaperman, on a fact-finding mission. Contrary to Byrnes’ hopes, Ethridge found conditions as bad as reported, and went to Moscow to convince the Soviet government to moderate Communist behavior. Ethridge’s damning report on political repression had little effect on Byrnes, who grabbed a face-saving Soviet offer. President Harry Truman, though, read Ethridge’s report and became convinced of the failure of Byrnes’ soft-line and the need to stand up to the Soviet Union.