Designing and Implementing Cross‐Sector Collaborations: Needed and Challenging

Theoretical and empirical work on collaboration has proliferated in the last decade. The authors’ 2006 article on designing and implementing cross‐sector collaborations was a part of, and helped stimulate, this growth. This article reviews the authors’ and others’ important theoretical frameworks from the last decade, along with key empirical results. Research indicates how complicated and challenging collaboration can be, even though it may be needed now more than ever. The article concludes with a summary of areas in which scholarship offers reasonably settled conclusions and an extensive list of recommendations for future research. The authors favor research that takes a dynamic, multilevel systems view and makes use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, especially using longitudinal comparative case studies.     

Nazi race ideologues

ABSTRACT

Stone argues that we need to disaggregate Nazi race ideologues since they do not form one undifferentiated mass. Ultimately, all the Nazis were race ideologues and chief among them were Hitler, Himmler and the other leading figures. All of the leading Nazis, whether they dealt specifically with ‘racial policy’ or not, put forward a racialized ideology, but those who made a name for themselves specifically as race theorists did not therefore all share the same views, nor did they all contribute in equal measure to the regime's crimes. Nor did race science, however deeply it threw its lot in with Nazism, drive the regime as much as did a kind of racial mysticism, or ‘thinking with the blood’. Here Stone suggests how we might evaluate the relative contributions made to the development of the Third Reich and its crimes by race scientists of different stripes, on the one hand, and theorists of racial-political conspiracies on the other.     

When Is Science Used in Science Policy? Examining the Importance of Scientific and Technical Information in National Research Council Reports

A frequent lament among researchers is that public policy makers should pay more attention to scientific and technical information (STI). If there is any single area where one might expect STI to be used in public policy making and agenda setting it is in science and technology policy. Many of the policy makers in science and technology policy are themselves scientists or researchers and presumably would prove especially receptive to STI. However, STI is only one of many types of information used in policy making and policy actors often differ in the extent to which they view STI as credible, particularly compared to other types of potentially policy‐relevant information. Research on credibility (the believability of information, information types, and media) has shown variance and policy makers’ “credibility maps.” Thus, some policy makers have preference for formal information generally and STI specifically, but others privilege raw data, personal experience, authority, history and anecdote, analogical reasoning, or conformance to ideology, to name just a few of the information choices. Here, we build on the current researchers’ previous bibliometrics‐based work and use data from 41 semi‐structured elite interviews with National Research Council (NRC) executives and staff and NRC committee members concerning the use of STI in reports issued by the NRC. Findings show that the use of STI in NRC reports varies according to the nature of the inquiry and the sponsor. Information used in the reports is based on not only the assessed credibility of information but also its perceived direct relevance and the availability of STI as compared to other types of information. In general, the amount of STI in the NRC reports tends to have modest effects on the likelihood that reports will be used in policy making or by the mass media. More important factors include the timing of the report with respect to political agendas, the party requesting the report, and the enacted roles of NRC staff members and committee chairs.     

Motives for maternal filicide: results from a study with female forensic patients

The objective of this study was to examine different motivational factors, leading mothers to commit neonaticidal, infanticidal or filicidal acts. This study was based on data gathered through a retrospective chart review of all filicidal women admitted to the Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Hospital in New York State (MHFPC) between 1976 and 2000 (n=57). Because our sample was drawn from MHFPC records it excludes filicidal mothers who went directly to prison. Our women were either found not competent to stand trial, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, or were convicted offenders who were seriously mentally ill and were not sent to prison. Fourteen percent committed neonaticide, meaning that they killed their child within the first day of its life; 21% killed the child after the first day but before it reached its first birthday (infanticide); and 65% committed filicide by murdering a child older than one. Two groups of women could be identified as having different motivational profiles: The neonaticidal mothers were mostly troubled by psychosis and social problems while the filicidal women were defined as severely depressed, with a history of self-directed violence and a high rate of suicide attempts following the filicidal offense.     

The law and politics of transnational rights protection: Trusteeship,effectiveness, de-delegation

International trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such courts the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by the states in order to realize specific values and interests. Human rights courts help states resolve commitment and enforcement problems that are inherent in human rights treaties. This study seeks to answer the question, what happens when states parties seek to reduce or eliminate the authority of a human rights court? To answer these questions, the article assesses six human rights treaty regimes: the Council of Europe; the Organization of American States; the African Union; the Economic Community of West African States; the East African Community; and the Southern African Development Community. The article identifies four types of de-delegation possible with respect to international human rights courts and assesses the extent to which states have sought to de-delegate from them. With one exception (the SADC Tribunal), the regimes examined here have so far successfully withstood the challenge of de-delegation.     

Reversing delegation? Politicization,de-delegation,and non-majoritarian institutions

Elected governments and states have delegated extensive powers to non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs) such as independent central banks and regulatory agencies, courts, and international trade and investment organizations, which have become central actors in governance. But, far from having resolved the balance between political control and governing competence or removed certain issues from political debate, NMIs have faced challenges to their legitimacy by elected officials and sometimes attempts to reverse delegation through “de-delegation”. Our special issue studies the politicization of NMIs, and then whether, why and how it leads to de-delegation through reducing the formal powers of NMIs or increasing controls over them. In this article, we examine how to analyze de-delegation, how politicization of NMIs has developed, and how it has affected de-delegation. We underline not only institutional rules that constrain elected officials but also the actions of NMIs themselves and their relationships with other NMIs as part of multi-level governance systems. We find that politicization has varied, but even when strong, elected officials have not introduced widespread and long-lasting de-delegation; on the contrary, they have frequently widened the powers of NMIs. Insofar as elected politicians have sought to curb NMIs, they have often preferred to use existing controls and non-compliance. Finally, we consider the wider implications of the combination of politicization and lack of de-delegation for broader issues of governance such as the division of powers between the elected and unelected and democratic accountability.