Subjective Invulnerability,Optimism Bias and Adjustment in Emerging Adulthood

The relationship between subjective invulnerability and optimism bias in risk appraisal, and their comparative association with indices of risk activity, substance use and college adjustment problems was assessed in a sample of 350 (M _age = 20.17; 73% female; 93% White/European American) emerging adults. Subjective invulnerability was measured with the newly devised adolescent invulnerability scale (AIS). Optimism bias in decision-making was assessed with a standard comparative-conditional risk appraisal task. Results showed that the danger- and psychological invulnerability subscales of the AIS demonstrated strong internal consistency and evidence of predictive validity. Subjective invulnerability and optimism bias were also shown to be empirically distinct constructs with differential ability to predict risk and adjustment. Danger invulnerability and psychological invulnerability were more pervasively associated with risk behavior than was optimism bias; and psychological invulnerability counter-indicated depression, self-esteem and interpersonal problems. Results support recent claims regarding the “two faces” of adolescent invulnerability. Implications for future research are drawn.     

Klagebefugnis aus dem allgemeinen Willkürverbot bei einem Verstoß gegen die Staatszielbestimmung Umweltschutz

Zusammenfassung Nach einer Entscheidung des Bayerischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs kann ein Bauleitplan wegen Versto? gegen das Willkürverbot aus Gründen des Umweltschutzes nichtig sein. Diese auf eine Popularklage ergangene Entscheidung er?ffnet die Frage, ob der Verfassungsgrundsatz des Willkürverbots auch im Rahmen von Verwaltungsakten herangezogen werden kann. Der Beitrag bejaht diese M?glichkeit.     

当前俄罗斯的有组织犯罪

有组织犯罪是俄罗斯社会的最大顽疾,近年来呈迅猛发展之势。有组织犯罪集团与政府官员相勾结,在政治、经济上与黑社会势力高度融合,并且广泛向世界各地渗透,呈现出国际化趋势,对国际社会造成严重威胁。     

Bureaucrats’ corruption and competition in public administration

Competition in public administration is often advocated as a solution to bureaucrats’ corruption. However, there are no well developed analyses of how competition could succeed and the issue of its detailed design has not been carefully addressed so far. In this paper, we put forward a series of models that help understand what competition in public administration can actually accomplish. We distinguish two different shapes that corruption may take: bribery and extortion, and we demonstrate, under the usual assumption of asymmetric information as to the honesty of the bureaucrats, that while competition is effective in fighting extortion it exacerbates bribery. Given that corruption normally manifests itself simultaneously under the two different shapes, an anti-corruption policy based upon competition is bound to face a serious trade-off: trying to curb one of them through competition implies making the other worse. This result holds, with some differences, under exogenous and endogenous bureaucrats’ “honesty”. The dual aspect of corruption is probably one of the most serious—and so far largely neglected—obstacles to any effective anti-corruption policy.