To fight or not to fight?

Public Choice - This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing...     

EXEMPT PROPRIETARY COMPANY ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: PUBUC INTEREST OR BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE-BUILDING?

Abstract: Australian small business enterprises, operated as exempt proprietary companies, are exposed to numerous statutory requirements. The Corporations Law Simplification Taskforce has proposed a number of changes with the stated objective of minimising the statutory burdens faced by small business. One of the recommendations of the taskforce is that most exempt proprietary companies be exempted from the requirement to supply key financial data in annual returns lodged with the Australian Securities Commission. This paper provides a review of the existing statutory responsibility for exempt proprietary companies to prepare annual returns including key financial data and lodge them with the ASC. A common justification offered for the introduction and continued maintenance of annual reporting requirements has been the protection of the public interest. The “public choice” theory of regulation provides alternative explanations for the regulation, including the promotion of producer interests or the promotion of the interests of the regulatory agency responsible for the administration of the legislation, the Australian Securities Commission, and other government departments such as Attorney-General's, Finance and Treasury. The existence of alternative explanations raises the possibility that the regulation is not motivated exclusively by the public interest. Indirect evidence of the usefulness of the annual reporting requirements was gathered with a consideration of the quality of the key financial data disclosed in annual returns. More than 40% of the annual returns lodged by a sample of exempt proprietary companies, during the years 1986 to 1989, contained key financial data which was inconsistent with being extracted from a properly prepared balance sheet (where assets minus liabilities equal shareholders' equity). The possibility that the maintenance of annual reporting requirements is not in the public interest, and the limited reliability of key financial data disclosures made, offers some support for the recent recommendations of the Corporations Law Simplification Taskforce that annual reporting requirements for small business enterprises be modified.     

ROAD GRANTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION AND THE BENEFITS OF DUPLICATION

Abstract: This article argues that direct commonwealth involvement in road funding and road policy has benefited the states and local government. Although inefficiencies and friction are evident as a result of joint funding, the benefits of multiple accountability outweigh the costs. A competitive dynamic underlies the involvement of all three levels of government, producing outcomes that no single government dominates, but which reflect in part the responses of each to their respective constituencies. The commonwealth has been driven to more intrusive forms of intervention as existing controls failed to achieve the commonwealth's objectives, and to expanding its financial contributions to counter the diversion of funds by state governments. Its commitment to funding the road program is likely to be highest when its specific purpose grants can be identified closely with the provision of roads in particular regions and localities. In sum, joint funding of the road program produces a system that is responsive to competing conceptions and interests, and the commonwealth's "voluntary vacancy" from all but "national" roads is on balance likely to be detrimental to the program.     

Medicaid's Role in Moves Toward Universal Health Care

This paper considers the problems currently facing the Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program in light of the major problems confronting the American health care system. Actual and proposed Medicaid reforms are reviewed, their merits noted and their shortcomings detailed. It is argued that substantial Medicaid reform can take place only in the context of radical reform of the entire U.S. health care system. Similarly, Medicaid should be incorporated into any plan aimed at providing universal health care coverage.     

More on moral hazard in organizations: Reply

The paper by Thomas Hammond and Gary Miller is an insightful comment on the relevance of budget-breaking incentive schemes to real world organizations. They have made a valuable contribution in considering this line of research within a broader context. Nonetheless, they have not established the invalidity of my theoretical arguments. Therefore, my basic point still holds: that is, theoretically it is possible to show that a bonus-penalty incentive scheme of the sort proposed by Holmström is feasible, despite the principal's incentive to cheat. Regardless, all of this debate may beg the question, since compensation arrangements observed in the real world are rarely of the bonus-penalty type. Linear incentives are far more common, and many compensation schemes do not appear to incorporate optimal incentives. At this point we need more empirical research on the determinants of incentives in organizations. In order to make further advances in this area, a better understanding of the incentive mechanisms actually used in organizations is required.Thanks are due to Richard Frank for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.     

The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking

It is possible that a budget breaking incentive scheme may not solve the problem of moral hazard in team production, due to an incentive for a principal to cheat on such an agreement. This is a problem common to incentive schemes which result in an unbalanced budget, which include among them processes designed to reveal demand for public goods. This paper shows the conditions under which cheating is possible, and designs a payment scheme for the principal which is free of any cheating incentive.     

The Roles a “Civil Society” Can Play in International Dispute Resolution

Since its very inception, the United Nations has worked with NGOs (non-governmental organizations) or, to use the contemporary term, a "civil society." In fact, every single U.N. department now has an NGO liaison. As the world becomes increasingly smaller, the role and influence of NGOs will continue to be significant in international negotiations.