To fight or not to fight?

Public Choice - This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing...     

ROAD GRANTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION AND THE BENEFITS OF DUPLICATION

Abstract: This article argues that direct commonwealth involvement in road funding and road policy has benefited the states and local government. Although inefficiencies and friction are evident as a result of joint funding, the benefits of multiple accountability outweigh the costs. A competitive dynamic underlies the involvement of all three levels of government, producing outcomes that no single government dominates, but which reflect in part the responses of each to their respective constituencies. The commonwealth has been driven to more intrusive forms of intervention as existing controls failed to achieve the commonwealth's objectives, and to expanding its financial contributions to counter the diversion of funds by state governments. Its commitment to funding the road program is likely to be highest when its specific purpose grants can be identified closely with the provision of roads in particular regions and localities. In sum, joint funding of the road program produces a system that is responsive to competing conceptions and interests, and the commonwealth's "voluntary vacancy" from all but "national" roads is on balance likely to be detrimental to the program.     

Medicaid's Role in Moves Toward Universal Health Care

This paper considers the problems currently facing the Medical Assistance (Medicaid) program in light of the major problems confronting the American health care system. Actual and proposed Medicaid reforms are reviewed, their merits noted and their shortcomings detailed. It is argued that substantial Medicaid reform can take place only in the context of radical reform of the entire U.S. health care system. Similarly, Medicaid should be incorporated into any plan aimed at providing universal health care coverage.     

ISTEA: A New Direction for Transportation Policy

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA)of 1991 is likely to be remembered as one of President Bush'smost significant contributions to government decentralizationand the ideals of New Federalism. It is a landmark piece oflegislation that makes wholesale revisions in the federal government'srole in transportation policy, providing state and, especially,local policymakers with an unprecedented opportunity to determinethe future direction of the nation's surface transportationprograms. However, at the same time it decentralized authorityover project selection, it continued to expandthe number ofcrossover sanctions attached to federal transportation fundingand preempted state authority over truck weights and lengths.This underscores recent research findings that suggest thatfederalism principles are important to federal policymakersbut not necessarily more important than other competing valuesthat emanate from different political, social, and economicviews.     

More on moral hazard in organizations: Reply

The paper by Thomas Hammond and Gary Miller is an insightful comment on the relevance of budget-breaking incentive schemes to real world organizations. They have made a valuable contribution in considering this line of research within a broader context. Nonetheless, they have not established the invalidity of my theoretical arguments. Therefore, my basic point still holds: that is, theoretically it is possible to show that a bonus-penalty incentive scheme of the sort proposed by Holmström is feasible, despite the principal's incentive to cheat. Regardless, all of this debate may beg the question, since compensation arrangements observed in the real world are rarely of the bonus-penalty type. Linear incentives are far more common, and many compensation schemes do not appear to incorporate optimal incentives. At this point we need more empirical research on the determinants of incentives in organizations. In order to make further advances in this area, a better understanding of the incentive mechanisms actually used in organizations is required.Thanks are due to Richard Frank for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.     

The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking

It is possible that a budget breaking incentive scheme may not solve the problem of moral hazard in team production, due to an incentive for a principal to cheat on such an agreement. This is a problem common to incentive schemes which result in an unbalanced budget, which include among them processes designed to reveal demand for public goods. This paper shows the conditions under which cheating is possible, and designs a payment scheme for the principal which is free of any cheating incentive.     

Evaluation of laser desorption mass spectrometry and UV accelerated aging of dyes on paper as tools for the evaluation of a questioned document

Laser desorption mass spectrometry (LDMS) may be used for the detection and identification of dyes found in inks. Naturally-aged and artificially-aged blue and black ballpoint pen inks containing the cationic dye methyl violet were analyzed on paper. The average molecular weight of the dye sample was calculated from LD mass spectral data and plotted versus time. The resulting aging curves demonstrate that, as dye degradation increases, the average molecular weight of the dye decreases. Typical variables involved in ink aging, such as the type of paper and ink formulation, were investigated. Results show that these variables influence the rate of dye degradation. Furthermore, UV accelerated aging has been developed and tested as an alternative to thermal approaches.