Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789–2000

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits.     

The Wisdom of Crowds: Learning from Administrators' Predictions of Citizen Perceptions

Public agencies use surveys to solicit feedback from citizens and targeted customer groups, but many experts question whether the results of these surveys are valuable. This paper explores how a recent innovation in citizen surveys—asking public administrators to predict how citizens will respond to survey questions—may be used to increase that value and, at the same time, provide additional data of interest on its own account. The innovation is explored through two surveys: (1) a public opinion poll of Georgia residents conducted by the authors for the Georgia Department of Transportation in January 2004, and (2) a brief survey of that agency's administrators asking for their predictions of public opinion. The prediction process appeared to increase the agency's interest in the resident survey. The findings document the frequent superiority of groups—what Surowiecki terms "the wisdom of crowds"—over individuals in predicting public opinion.     

Racing to the Bottom? Trade,Environmental Governance,and ISO 14001

Globalization critics argue that international trade spurs a race to the bottom among national environmental standards. ISO 14001 is the most widely adopted voluntary environmental regulation which encourages firms to take environmental action beyond what domestic government regulations require. Drawing on a panel study of 108 countries over seven years, we investigate conditions under which trade linkages can encourage ISO 14001 adoption, thereby countering environmental races to the bottom. We find that trade linkages encourage ISO 14001 adoption if countries' major export markets have adopted this voluntary regulation.     

Behavioural Decision Theory and the Gains Debate in International Politics

The temptation to free ride and the fear of exploitation are traditionally offered as factors explaining individuals' choices under conditions of social dilemma. In two experimental studies of prisoner's dilemma behaviour we demonstrate that the ratio-differences of payoffs are as important as the absolute differences in affecting the likelihood of cooperation. The implications of this additional structural determinant of dilemma choice are developed and applied to the stalled gains debate in international relations theory. By incorporating ratio-differences into the analysis 'realist' and 'liberal' theories of state behaviour may be reconciled.     

Psychosocial Correlates of Intimacy Achievement Among Adolescent Fathers-to-Be

We investigated the relation between urban psychosocial stressors and intimacy achievement in a sample of 59 African American, Hispanic American, and White adolescent fathers-to-be. Participants received an intimacy score based on Orlofsky's Intimacy Status Rating Scale. Those with higher cumulative psychosocial stressors had lower levels of intimacy. One psychosocial risk factor, low interpersonal empathy, was significantly associated with intimacy levels. African Americans had lower levels of intimacy than Hispanic or White participants.     

Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964–1984

Several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on-the-job consumption, or ideological behavior. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support. This paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse. The results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general-election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support. A corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly.