“The European Union, Vietnam, and Human Rights as Law: the case of the 1995 EU–Vietnam framework agreement and its human rights clause.”

The year 1995 marked a major watershed for modern Vietnam. It completed its post-Cold War strategy of “multilateralizing” its foreign policy by joining ASEAN, normalizing relations with the US, and signing a comprehensive framework agreement with the EU. All three are recognized as major accomplishments for modern Vietnamese diplomacy. However, in the EU–Vietnam framework agreement, Hanoi made an unprecedented concession when it agreed to the human rights clause in the treaty. For the very first time, Vietnam had accepted an explicit, legally binding stipulation on human rights in a bilateral treaty. This remarkable development resulted from the confluence of three major dynamics. First, Hanoi had committed itself to establish sound relations with all major economic centers-of-gravity at the time, ASEAN, the US, and the EU. Second, the EU also was keenly interested in stronger relations with Asian countries but was flexible about prioritizing any particular bilateral relationship. Third, Brussels’ diplomats had to work off a treaty template when negotiating fundamental bilateral agreements. The standard EU framework agreement at the time included a human rights clause. In 1995, the EU was insisting that any treaty with Vietnam would have to include a clause on human rights. Initially, Hanoi rejected such a treaty provision, and the negotiations stalled. However, when Hanoi realized that Brussels felt no urgency to complete the treaty and was unable to compromise on human rights, Vietnam’s leadership reconsidered. In order to complete the strategy of “multilateralizing” its international affairs, Vietnam had to accept the human rights clause in the treaty with the EU.     

Macroscopical estimation of the post mortem interval (PMI) and exclusion of the forensically relevant resting period--a comparison of data presented in the literature with recent osteological findings

The aim of the present study was to determine to what extent macroscopical parameters mentioned in the literature are suitable for the estimation of the post mortem interval (PMI) and particularly for the exclusion of the forensically relevant resting period for recent bone material. The macroscopical examination of recent bone material with a known PMI showed that only one published parameter (relics of adipocere in the cross section of the compacta) was consistent with our findings for this particular resting period (27-28 years). Other macroscopical parameters presented in the literature were contradictory to the results observed in this study. Among those are the rigidity of bones, the adhesion of soft tissue, the filling of the marrow cavity, and the permeation of the epiphyses with adipocere. Concerning the exclusion of the forensically relevant resting period, a similar result was observed. This study identified some diagnostic findings in bones with a resting period of less than 50 years which according to the literature should only be present after a resting period of more than 50 years. These features included the lack of macroscopical traces of adipocere, degradation of the compacta surface, detachment of the cortical substance, the ability of bone to be broken with bare hands, and superficial usures. Moreover, in one-third of our cases we identified some intra-individual differences not previously described in the literature. In addition to the other results, those intra-individual differences make an estimation of the PMI more difficult. However it should be noted that those published parameters were collected from bone material which was stored in a "relatively arid sand-grit-clay soil of the broken stone layer of Munich". The bones in the present study were stored in acidic and clayey-loamy soil, partly with lateral water flow. In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that one should use caution estimating the post mortem interval and excluding the forensically relevant resting period, even when all available results are considered.     

Maneuvering with Crime. An Empirical Reconstruction of “Populist” Stances on Youth Crime in German Parliamentary Debates

Recent years have seen a wide discussion of populism in penal policy, which is internationally regarded as a strong drive for establishing punitive tendencies. Generally, “penal populism” is characterized by an extensive consensus across the most influential political parties, a punitive orientation, and the dismissal of scientific or professional expertise. Recent penal policy therefore appears to be a relatively unified practice strongly oriented toward punitive measures that primarily address the public and its perceived need for protection. Because analyses of Anglophone countries are predominant in this discussion, we contrast them with a reconstruction of debates on youth crime in German parliaments from 1970 to 2012. They exhibit a wide variety of populist articulations. Although they imply a strong punitive bias, they also encompass a very heterogeneous rhetoric of penal policy. In conclusion, we argue that penal populism can (and should) be described as a tactical practice, i.e., as political maneuvering employed to negotiate the prospects of punitive and other styles of politics.     

Participation and Political Equality in Direct Democracy: Educative Effect or Social Bias

This paper analyses the moderating effect of direct democracy on the relationship between socioeconomic status and electoral participation. A sceptical position holds that direct democracy increases social bias in the electorate as issues are too complex and demanding. Participatory democrats in contrast invoke an educative effect of direct democratic institutions, thus decreasing social bias within the electorate. To test both arguments we use data from the Swiss cantons and estimate cross‐level interactions of socioeconomic and direct democracy variables on electoral participation. First differences between effects in the least and most direct democratic cantons are not statistically significant. This result may be seen as relief for sceptics as well as dampener for proponents of direct democracy.     

The Meaning of Students’ Personal Belief in a Just World for Positive and Negative Aspects of School-Specific Well-Being

In two cross-sectional questionnaire studies with N = 1792 German and Indian students, aged between 12 and 17 years, we investigated the relation between personal belief in a just world (BJW) and positive as well as negative dimensions of school-specific well-being. Furthermore, we considered students’ personal experience of teacher justice as possible mediator in this relation and controlled for confounding effects of gender, neuroticism, and locus of control. In Study 1, we used multilevel modeling to analyze the German data and to control for class-level effects. In accordance with our hypotheses, Study 1 showed that the more students believed in a personal just world, the better their positive attitudes toward school, their academic self-esteem, and their enjoyment in school were, and the less somatic complaints in school, social problems in school, and worries toward school they experienced. These associations partly differed between classes, but generally persisted when controlled for sex, neuroticism, and locus of control. Finally, the association between personal BJW and well-being was at least partly mediated by students’ personal experience of teacher justice. In Study 2, we focused on the generalizability of the pattern of results across different cultural contexts. However, we did not aim to carry out comparative research. Results from bootstrap mediation analyses were predominantly the same as in Study 1. The adaptive functions of BJW and implications for future school research are discussed.     

Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority

One of the most common arguments in favour of the state's authority is that without the coordinating hand of political institutions, we could not achieve important moral benefits. I argue that if we understand authority correctly, then coordination cannot even in principle establish that coordinators have political authority.