Diplomacy and intelligence

'Intelligence' as a discrete institution is part of twentieth-century government. It combines the skills of covert collection with expertise on certain subjects. Its differentiation from legitimate diplomacy is on the whole clear: intelligence provides information by special methods, diplomacy uses it. Nevertheless, there are numerous operational overlaps. Intelligence's overseas liaisons interact with diplomacy and foreign policy. Embassies act as intelligence bases and are targets for local intelligence attacks. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office plays a leading part in intelligence assessment. Some distancing between diplomacy and covert intelligence is desirable, but Western intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has sometimes been portrayed. In Britain, in particular, intelligence's knowledge has not meant power.     

The justification of punishment and the justification of political authority

Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not so grounded, deterrence and retributive theories are incomplete as they are typically formulated. The intuitions behind these theories can be satisfied in a variety of complete theories, i.e., theories that understand the justification of punishment in relation to the justification of state authority. A consequence of this is that at least some of the intuitions underlying deterrence and retributive theories can be satisfied at the same time by a given theory.     

Are bribe payments in Tanzania “grease” or “grit”?

This article uses empirical evidence from Tanzania to show that bribes there are not “greasing” but instead encumber economic transactions. The evidence suggests that bribe payments promote contacts with service providers, result in lower satisfaction with public service delivery, and result in less efficient public services. Further evidence against bribes as ‘facilitators’ is presented in the form of opinion polls and actions taken to reduce bribe payments. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.