A Pluralist Critique of Contractarian Proceduralism

In pluralistic societies with conflicting conceptions of the good, purely procedural justice looms as particularly attractive. Moreover, the social contract device, in at least some of its conceptual adaptations, appears capable of yielding purely procedural outcomes. Based on an assessment of the respective contractarian arguments of Hobbes and Rawls, the author asserts that contractarian proceduralism is either purely procedural but not just, or else just but only derivatively procedural. Finally, after proposing that Habermas' discourse ethics and proceduralist paradigm of law can be regarded as the perfection and culmination of contractarianism, the author concludes that it also ultimately fails to produce purely procedural justice.     

Philosophy in Law? A Legal‐Philosophical Inquiry

Going beyond the debate between positivists and proponents of natural law, there is a controversy over whether there can or ought to be “philosophy in law” (i.e., whether anything within the subject‐matter of philosophy can also become part of the subject‐matter of law). According to Luhmann's autopoietic theory, law is a normatively closed system and accordingly remains completely independent from philosophy. Dworkin, on the other hand, asserts that constitutional law depends for its coherence and integrity on being encompassed within a particular political philosophy. This essay approaches “philosophy in law” from a functional rather than a legitimating perspective, and concludes against both Luhmann and Dworkin that the integration of philosophy in law is interstitial and limited. The consequence of this for law's validity and legitimacy is a likely increase in contestation and contestability. The essay concludes that by embracing pluralism as a philosophy, one can reduce and better manage contestability without ever becoming able to eliminate it.     

Accountability in Australian Government: Towards the Year 2000

This symposium is based on a workshop held at the Australian National University on 27 March 1998, sponsored by the Australia Institute, the Centre for Australian Public Centre Management at Griffith University and the Institute of Public Administration, Australia. The Political Science Program, within the Research School of Social Sciences, at the ANU provided a congenial environment for the workshop. Marian Simms is grateful to Barry Hindess for his ongoing support for the 'Accountability in Australian Government' project. More particularly Christel Cools, Louise Sims and Wayne Naughton provided technical back-up. Peter McCarthy assisted with library research. Dhammika Dharmapala made useful comments on the final version.     

Multi-Stage: A Rule-Based Evolution of Future Commitments under the Climate Change Convention

This article presents the regional emission targets corresponding to different climate regimes for differentiating commitments beyond 2012 on the basis of the Multi-Stage approach. This approach assumes a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules. The analysis focuses on two global greenhouse gas emission profiles resulting in CO₂-equivalent concentrations stabilising at 550 and 650 ppmv in 2100 and 2150, respectively. Three Multi-Stage cases have been developed in order to assess different types of thresholds. These share three consecutive stages representing different commitments: stage 1 – no quantitative commitments; stage 2 – emission–limitation targets and stage 3 – emission reduction targets. The analysis shows that by 2025 all three cases result in emission reduction objectives for all Annex I regions of at least 30–55% below their 1990 levels for 550 ppmv, whereas for 650 ppmv target they range from 0 to 20%. Furthermore, early participation is required of the major non-Annex I regions through emission limitation targets i.e. before 2025 and 2050 for the 550 and 650 ppmv targets, respectively. The first participation threshold for adopting emission–limitation targets on the basis of a capability–responsibility index (as introduced here) can provide for a balanced and timely participation of non-Annex I regions. Major strengths and weaknesses of the climate regimes are discussed and important obstacles and pre-conditions for their feasibility and acceptability are highlighted.