A Political Economy Forecast for the 2005 British General Election

Recently, we proposed an original statistical model for forecasting general elections in the United Kingdom, based on the observation of a few key indicators of the political and economic system. That vote function model was tested against the results of the 2001 general election. Here we evaluate the results of that test, and offer an appropriately revised model for the forecasting of the upcoming 2005 general election. According to our forecast, a Labour victory appears the most likely outcome.     

Political Reform in Hong Kong: the Principal Officials Accountability System. The first year (2002–2003)

The new Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS), a proto-ministerial system, was established at the start of the Second Term of Office of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). This paper examines the setting-up of the POAS and reviews how it has functioned during its first year of life. Both the design and implementation of the POAS were characterized by undue haste. The establishing of the POAS intensified the debate on a range of matters as new ministers, senior civil servants and residents have come to terms with the detail of this novel arrangement. Discussions about political reform are set to intensify in the years to come. This article reviews the origins and deeper need for the POAS in Hong Kong before looking at the fundamentals of the new system. The nature of ‘accountability’ is then discussed prior to examining Hong Kong's experience with the POAS in action during its first year. The article also discusses the potential of the POAS to contribute to Hong Kong's overall political development.     

Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics

The study of reputation is one of the foundational topics of modern international relations. However, fundamental questions remain, including the question of to whom reputations adhere: states, leaders, or both? We offer a theory of influence‐specific reputations (ISR) that unifies competing accounts of reputation formation. We theorize that reputations will adhere more to actors who are more influential in the relevant decision‐making process. We employ two survey experiments, one abstract and one richly detailed involving a U.S.‐Iran conflict, to evaluate ISR. We find evidence of large country‐specific reputations and moderately sized leader‐specific reputations. Consistent with the theory of influence‐specific reputations, leader‐specific reputations are more important when leaders are more influential.