A lesson in bureaucratic persistence: the provision of rehabilitation and resource management services in the Maritimes, 1943–81

Abstract One of the most interesting yet seldom analysed organizational phenomena concerns ‘bureaucratic persistence.’ It speaks to the uncanny capacity of some organizations to meet the requirements of survival over long periods of time. They do so typically through adaptive adjustments in their internal and external relations. This paper provides one of the first analyses of bureaucratic persistence in the Canadian system. It records the staying power of a Nova Scotia-based agency, the Maritime Marshlands Rehabilitation Administration (MMRA). Conceived in 1943 as an emergency repair project on one dyke in Amherst, it survived, grew and eventually underwent a metamorphosis to become the Maritime Resource Management Service (MSMS), providing sophisticated interdisciplinary resource management and information services to private and public users. As such, the MMRA-MRMS experience provides a convincing confirmation of bureaucratic persistence in Canada. It does more, however. The analysis shows that the specific dynamics of bureaucratic persistence owe much to the particular character of the regime within which it is found. In the case of MMRA-MRMK, the pre-eminence of cabinet in the legislative process and regional dynamics within the federal system were central. What is more, it becomes apparent that the continuation of a valid or a politically salient function must be a core element in bureaucratic persistence. Sommaire. La persistance bureaucratique est l'un des phénomènes organisationnels les plus fascinants mais il a pourtant été rarement analysé. II s'agit de l'étrange pouvoir qu'ont certaines organisations de satisfaire am exigences de survie pendant de longues périodes. Elles y arrivent habituellement grâce à des adaptations dans Ieurs relations internes et externes. Cet article présente l'une des premières analyses de persistance bureaucratique dans le système canadien. Il décrit comment s'est perpétuée une agence de Amherst en Nouvelle-Ecosse, connue sous le nom de Maritime Marshlands Rehabilitation Administration (MMRA). Conçu en 1943 comme un projet de réparation d'urgence d'une digue, cet organisme a surVécu, s'est élargi et s'est finalement transformé en Maritime Resource Management Service (MRMS); il a procuré au secteur public et privé d'excellents services interdisciplinaires d'information et de gestion de ressources. Le cas MMRA-MRMS foumit donc une confirmation convaincante de la persistance bureaucratique au Canada. Mais il ne s'arrête pas là. L'analyse démontre que la dynamique particulière de persistance bureaucratique dépend beaucoup du caractère spécifique du régime dans lequel elle se développe. Dans le cas du MMRA-MRMS, la prééminence du cabinet dans le processus légidatif et la dynamique régionale au sein du système fédéral étaient très importantes. Par ailleurs, il va sans dire qu'il est indispensable au phénomène de persistance bureaucratique que la fonction soit valide et politiquement importante.     

Public interest lobbies: membership and influence

In this paper we examine empirically the determinants of membership in Common Cause and Public Citizen, two “public interest” lobbies. We find that the only variable significantly associated with membership in these organizations is number of college graduates in a state. We also examine voting by Congressmen on five issues on which one of the lobbies had taken a stand, and we find that in four cases the number of members in a state in the lobby is significantly associated with voting on the bill by Congressmen from the state, after adjusting for all economic variables. We interpret these results to indicate that participation by citizens does have some impact on the legislative process.     

Negativity in political perception

The tendency for negative information to have more weight than equally extreme or equally likely positive information appears in a variety of cognitive processing tasks, but has rarely been documented empirically in politics. This paper provides evidence for two types of negativity effects in electoral behavior: negativity in the formation of impressions (of Humphrey and Nixon in 1968, of McGovern and Nixon in 1972, and of Carter and Reagan in 1980), and negativity as a consequence of impressions (in the 1974 and 1978 congressional elections). Both post hoc rationalization and the nonequivalence of the positive and negative information were examined and ruled out as artifactual explanations for these results. Discussion centered around two possible explanations for negativity, a cost-orientation hypothesis (which holds that people are more strongly motivated to avoid costs than to approach gains) and a figure-ground hypothesis (which holds that negative information stands out against a general positive background).