The Penal Voluntary Sector in England and Wales: Adaptation to Unsettlement and Austerity

This article draws on some findings from research which investigated penal voluntary sector adaptation to the mixed market in criminal justice services. The article firstly reprises the main trends for aligning state relationships with the voluntary sector from the 1980s to the present. We then outline some findings about adaptive experiences, situations and practices of the voluntary sector in criminal justice resettlement in the light of considerable upheaval. The research found that service providing voluntary sector organisations (VSOs) either outwardly comply with, or, in a minority of cases, actively embrace, competitive marketised models of service delivery. Secondly, the sector has normalised commercial approaches to organisational efficiency as well as aligned with bureaucratic practices common to the statutory sector. Despite charges that they are effectively co‐opted by both state and market interests, many have reported conflicts between prioritising long‐term financial viability with their founding ‘ethos and values’. We conclude that while many VSOs have successfully adjusted to market and bureaucratic norms, aspects of that repositioning have been at a cost to their traditions of relative autonomy, localism and distinctiveness, to the possible detriment of a vigorous civil society.     

On the political economy of state highway expenditures: Some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models

This paper explores the extent to which the public demand for roads and/or power of special interest groups determines road expenditures at the state level using an extension of the methodology developed in Congleton and Shughart (1990). Reduced form models of median voter demand, special interest group equilibria, and a combined model are estimated using cross-sectional state data from the United States. We generally find support for the hypothesis that voting matters. The pure median voter models have a better fit than the pure special interest group models. Moreover, in our combined model, we find that variables from the median-voter model can not be dropped without significantly reducing the combined model's fit.     

Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross–National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability

This article examines different explanations for the cross–national diffusion of three recent innovations in bureaucratic accountability—the institution of the ombudsman, freedom of information legislation and data protection (information privacy) law. The first two explanations are based on the assumption that these innovations are by–products of modernization, either the growth of the state or democratization. The third assumes that policy is shaped through processes of international communication. A combination of methodologies is employed to conclude that while the growth of government and liberal democratic values are necessary conditions for the adoption of all three policy instruments, they are not sufficient conditions. The pattern of adoption observed is best explained by examining how evidence about these respective policies flows from adopting states to non–adopters. In the case of the ombudsman, this process can be characterized as one of lesson–drawing; for freedom of information, evidence is used for legitimation purposes; for data protection, the diffusion is attributable to harmonization through international organizations. Policy transfer is hence a multi–faceted concept that embraces a number of distinct processes of transnational learning and communication.     

Truth,Lies, and Videotape: An Investigation of the Ability of Federal Parole Officers to Detect Deception

The ability of a group of Canadian federal parole officers to detect deception was investigated over the course of 2 days of lie detection training. On the first day of training, 32 officers judged the honesty of 12 (6 true, 6 fabricated) videotaped speakers describing personal experiences, half of which were judged before and half judged after training. On the second day, 5 weeks later, 20 of the original participants judged the honesty of another 12 videotapes (again, 6 pre- and 6 posttraining). To isolate factors relating to detection accuracy, three groups of undergraduate participants made judgments on the same 24 videotapes: (1) a feedback group, which received feedback on accuracy following each judgment, (2) a feedback + cue information group, which was given feedback and information on empirically based cues to deception, and (3) a control group, which did not receive feedback or cue information. Results indicated that at baseline all groups performed at or below chance levels. However, overall, all experimental groups (including the parole officers) became significantly better at detecting deception than the control group. By the final set of judgments, the parole officers were significantly more accurate (M = 76.7%) than their baseline performance (M = 40.4%) as well as significantly more accurate than the control group (M = 62.5%). The results indicate that detecting deceit is difficult, but training and feedback can enhance detection skills.