The case for Agrarian capitalism: A response to albritton

Albritton finds Brenner's designation ‘agrarian capitalism’ inappropriate for early English agriculture, as the law of value and the commodification of labour are undeveloped. But Brenner is not theorising a ‘full‐blown’ capitalism. His theory traces a process of transition, by which new rules for social reproduction and a new capitalist logic unfolded gradually. Albritton's evidence, moreover, actually supports Brenner's thesis. Charges of class reductionism misconstrue Brenner's efforts to overcome the tendency to dichotomise society into political and economic spheres. Brenner's theory provides what the bourgeois paradigm does not: a logical explanation of how market dependency and capitalist classes emerged.     

Precautionary Maybe,but What's the Principle? The Precautionary Principle,the Regulation of Risk,and the Public Domain

The 'precautionary principle', originating in the field of environmental protection but now widely applied, is a major point for discussion in the regulation of risk. Though promising proactive and pre-emptive intervention to prevent potentially irreversible harm, its precise meaning remains somewhat unclear. Legal systems tend to view it as procedural rather than substantive, and debates abound regarding its 'stronger' or 'weaker' versions and, indeed, the very concept of 'risk'. It is also necessary to discuss how the principle operates in varying administrative and constitutional contexts but the key task is to clarify the principle's fundamental value base. If its essentially collective orientation is highlighted, it may better ensure that democratic and non-pecuniary interests are given due prominence in regulatory contexts otherwise dominated by economic interests and technological imperatives, and it may then play an important role in reasserting the values of the public domain in the face of powerful private interests.     

Science,Evidence and Logic

Bernard Robertson and G.A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom , Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, xxi + 240 pp, hb £24.95.     

Patriotic Virtue

Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vis-à-vis one another, but not towards other states or citizens. However, many of those people, particularly philosophical liberals, also hold that morally insignificant differences, such as place of birth, sex or ethnicity, should not affect rights, liberties and life prospects. On the face of it, these two sets of ideas appear incompatible and point to a conflict in some liberal thought. Liberal philosophers, like John Rawls, have attempted to reconcile these conflicting ideas. His attempt has attracted a great deal of criticism, especially from those liberals attracted to a more cosmopolitan point of view. In this article, we use Aristotelian virtue ethics as the basis upon which to reconcile liberalism and patriotism. We argue that the state should be understood as an agent that stands in a special relationship to its citizens (of philia ). The state's virtue depends, in part, on it giving those citizens preferential treatment with regard to justice compared to citizens of other countries. Similarly, if citizens are to be just in their relations with their own state, they must behave in special ways towards that state as compared to other states. Certain forms of justice only arise in relationships of particular kinds.