Finding hidden value through mixed-methodology: Lessons From the Discovery Program’s Holistic Approach to Truancy Abatement

Policy makers often bemoan the shortcomings and inefficiency of youth development and similar social work programs whose effectiveness cannot be demonstrated by quantifiable performance indicators. This study argues, through illustration of the Odyssey Learning Center’s Discovery Program (an alternative school serving rural Southern youth in an abject poverty context), that program value can only be evidenced through a mixed-methodological evaluation design. Reasons precluding traditional statistical analysis and effectiveness determinations are discussed and alternative conceptualizations of program value are considered. This research was funded from Federal Grant Number 2002-JE-FX-0034 from the United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention through the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Office of Justice Programs. Points of view or opinions stated are those of the researchers and do not necessarily represent the opinion or official position of the United States Department of Justice or the South Carolina Department of Public Safety.     

Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients

The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clientsis well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless ofthe outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the caseeven when it is not in the best interest of the client, mayspend more hours working on the case than the client would want,and may reject a settlement when the client would be betteroff if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensatedaccording to the conventional contingent fee arrangement—underwhich he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlementbut bears all of the cost of litigation—the lawyer mayhave an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spendtoo little time working on it if it is brought, and may encouragea settlement when the client would be better off going to trial.In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyersthat overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer andthe client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingentfee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have thelawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation—thesame fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement.We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyerbears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that heobtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeableclient would want him to do with respect to accepting the case,spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under ourmodified contingent fee system, a third party would compensatethe lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return forwhich the lawyer would pay that party an up-front fee. In thisway, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case werelost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system.     

The Logic of Private and Collective Action

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation .     

Rent seekers who demand government production: Bureaucratic output and the price of complements

Many goods and services produced by government bureaus are sold at prices which do not maximize net revenues (maximize profits or minimize losses). Indeed, bureaucratic institutions typically create incentives to expand production beyond that which would maximize net revenues. Furthermore, many of the products sold by government bureaus are highly complementary to privately produced goods and services. If a bureau's output is not priced to maximize net revenues, then private sellers of various complements may be in a position to extract rents by adjusting their prices. This paper explores the implications of bureaucratically generated rents for privately produced complements. First, rent seeking can materialize when private sector interests apply pressure for expanded bureau production and lower bureau prices. Second, if the bureau does expand its production capacity beyond the net revenue maximizing level, and if a private producer obtains exclusive rights to supply complements, then the extraction of rents will result in an inefficient mix of resources in bureaucratic production. The basis of the inefficiency is not the reason often given, however. Rather, inefficiencies arise because the actual level of use is less than that which the ‘bureaucratic plant’ was constructed to produce due to the relatively high price of the complementary services.     

AHRA does not protect device distributor against copyright claims arising from broadcaster role

In a case of first impression, and one of the few cases interpretingthe statute at issue, a district court in New York City hasheld that the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 USC sections 1001et seq. (‘AHRA’), does not immunize a distributorof digital audio recording devices (DARDs) from copyright liabilitywhen the infringement claims are based on the distributor'sallegedly infringing activity in its simultaneous role as asatellite radio broadcaster. The case illustrates the ambiguousnature of digital transmissions, which can be treated as distributionsof musical works as well as digital performances.     

suicidal adolescents: Family dynamics and the effects of lethality and hopelessness

The purpose of this study was to develop a profile of the family dynamics of suicidal adolescents regarding the constructs of overprotection, enmeshment, rigidity, and conflict avoidance. The relationship of the family dynamics, and adolescent's degree of hopelessness, and the lethality of the suicidal behavior were also examined. The Structural Family Interaction Scale, Marital Satisfaction Inventory, Hopelessness Scale, and lethality rating were utilized to assess the families and groups. The total sample (N=49) was comprised of two groups: the families with suicidal adolescents groups (N=34), and the nonsuicidal, symptomatic adolescents group (N=15). Results supported hypotheses that the families were similar in overprotection and enmeshment, and that suicidal families were more rigid and conflict avoidant. Hopelessness and lethality were not significant, although lethality contributed to the variance in the perceptions of marital relationships in suicidal families.Private practice in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Graduate student, currently completing a Ph.D. in counseling and human development, at The University of Iowa. Research interests include marriage and family therapy and adolescents.Received a Ph.D. from the State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York. Main research interests are in family stress, and the impact of physical illness on family organization and dynamics.