L'Italie — Le Bicaméralisme Imparfait: Du Sénat du Royaume au Sénat de la République

Summary

Imperfect Bicameralism: Italy from the Senate of the Monarchy to the Senate of the Republic

1. The creation of the royal Senate; 2. The Italian antecedents of the 1848 Senate; 3. Projects for the reform of the Senate; 4. G. Mosca: the eulogy of imperfect bicameralism; 5. The end of the royal Senate and the birth of the republican Senate; 6. The current debate on bicameralism in Italy.     

The Anti‐Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

This paper identifies key obstacles of law enforcement that may frustrate a policy that fights the facilitation of collusion. It outlines remedial actions against features that facilitate collusion and examines to what extent authorities––such as Directorate General (DG) for Competition, National Competition Authorities and regulators––have the powers and ability to take these actions. The analysis covers a number of legal tools including the theory of harm of coordinated effects in European merger control, Articles 101 and 102 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, stricter national laws and regulation. I conclude that DG Competition has little powers to act, except for merger control. Although NCAs and regulators may enjoy broader powers, tough challenges lie ahead in terms of the exercise of discretion, error and effectiveness of remedial actions.