Collaborative Decision Making in Urban Regeneration: A Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective

In this paper we examine the processes and participants in urban regeneration with a view to identifying the nature of collaborative decision making in a particular policy arena. Recognizing that the environment in which public managers operate is a complex nexus of agency, structure, environment, and feedback processes, we apply a complex adaptive systems (CAS) framework comprised of agents, rules, outcomes, decision factors, and processes within the public policy arena—in this case urban regeneration in Ireland—in order to explore collaborative decision making in the public domain. The CAS framework draws particular attention to self-organizing features of the system under study and to the emergence of agents, order (“rules”), and outcomes. Using this framework, we found that three of the six urban regeneration projects (“systems”) in our study featured the emergence of project specific agents as important facilitators of collaborative decision making and as key contributors to the expansion of system scope.     

The Zeal of the Civil Advocate

This article is concerned with the accountability of the civil advocate for results obtained for a client. It distinguishes the criminal trial by arguing that for effective implementation the adversary system, as it is commonly understood, requires that the professional advocates be equally competent and equally adversary and that because it does not meet these criteria, the criminal trial cannot be looked to as a model either of the adversary system or of the behavior of advocates in the civil trial. Rules of behavior for the civil litigator should be drawn with the primary objective of ascertaining truth. Moreover, the civil litigator cannot claim immunity from moral accountability by reference to the lawyer's role; he or she is personally accountable for an immoral result obtained for a client. Seeking to avoid this accountability all lawyers might reject an immoral but lawful cause, so that persons with such causes would be deprived of professional representation. The conflict between the lawyer's personal morality and the social value of professional assistance is resolved by reference to a formula for assigning counsel similar to those in Mathews v. Eldridge and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. The author analyzes the moral dilemma of a lawyer who is so assigned and proposes a solution.