Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments

Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty?

Abstract.  The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against which empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean voter theorem' stating that parties converge to the electoral center. Empirical analysis based on the vote-maximizing premise, however, invalidates this convergence result. We consider both empirical and formal models that incorporate exogeneous valence terms for the parties. Valence can be regarded as an electorally perceived attribute of each party leader that is independent of the policy position of the party. We show that the mean voter theorem is valid for empirical multinomial logit and probit models of a number of elections in the Netherlands and Britain. To account for the non-centrist policy positions of parties, we consider a more general formal model where valence is also affected by the behavior of party activists. The results suggest that non-convergent policy choice by party leaders can be understood as rational, vote-maximizing calculation by leaders in response to electoral and activist motivations.     

Representation in the English House of Commons: The New Boroughs, 1485–1640

SUMMARY

In this paper Norman Ball re-examines the well recognised process of enlarging the House of Commons in the Tudor and early Stuart periods by the creation of new, or the revival of old parliamentary boroughs. The usual explanation of the phenomenon has been that it met pressures from local gentry for wider access to parliamentary seats. The paper questions this interpretation, noting the new seats often appeared in areas that were already well provided with borough places. On the basis of a geographical analysis of the new boroughs it is shown that there was a preponderance of creations in the lands of the two royal duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster. It goes on to suggest that the main motive behind the creations was the need of the crown and its advisers to find places for reliable members who could assist the royal business managers in carrying through an expanding volume of parliamentary business.     

Legislative Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Performance

Do term limits impede the ability of legislators to effectively set fiscal policy? To address this question, I examine state bond ratings from 1996 to 2009. Bond ratings serve as a valuable indicator of a state's fiscal performance, gauging the risk and uncertainty that investors face when buying these bonds. In addition, bond ratings are important policy ends in themselves. High bond ratings make it easier for states to borrow and raise revenue, while lowering interest rates. Results from analyses of “Term‐Limitedness” and legislator experience suggest that term limits negatively impact a state's fiscal performance, leading to lower bond ratings.     

National Government Policy Options for Contributing to Regional Economic Stability: The US Department of Energy's Major Nuclear Weapons Sites

We have conducted economic simulation, historical, and survey research that considers the national government's obligation to the regions that surround the places where it developed and tested nuclear weapons. The research shows that the strongest case for an obligation is at four site regions: Hanford (Washington), Idaho, Oak Ridge (Tennessee), and Savannah River (Georgia, South Carolina). These four are dependent on the Department of Energy (DOE), have relatively low incomes, are expected to grow less economically than their counterparts and the nation as a whole, and suffer from environmental stigma. We reviewed and simulated the impacts of a variety of tools, including severance packages, onsite projects, and offsite economic investments. In essence, investments in severance packages, education, and recreation are more effective per dollar invested than high technology, but all investments are less effective in these dependent regions than in larger metropolitan areas because of the economic leakage out of these dependent regions. The national government needs to begin a process of working with these regions to help them deal with the shock of shrinking their dependency on the DOE.