Out of Place and Out of Line: Positioning the Police in the Regulation of Financial Markets

In November of 2003, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police launched a major initiative to combat securities fraud in Canada. Spurred by the Enron scandals in the United States, this involved the establishment of a series of specialized white-collar crime units with the express mandate of investigating serious cases of securities fraud and protecting investors from the worst of the market's abuses. After four years of activity, these units have produced little in the way of tangible results and have been widely criticized in legal, financial, and regulatory communities. Drawing on thirty-five interviews with members of these units, as well as outside stakeholders including Crown Attorneys and private litigators, this article examines the activities of these Integrated Market Enforcement Teams and highlights a number of barriers to the successful execution of their designated mandate. While factors such as procedural restrictions and limited expertise are certainly relevant, this analysis reveals that the IMET teams are more fundamentally constrained by their position in a broader regulatory field. Understanding this field, and its unique structure and politics, is essential in coming to terms with both the possibilities and limitations of securities enforcement in an increasingly complex financial world.     

MANAGING CITIZEN CALLS TO THE POLICE: THE IMPACT OF BALTIMORE'S 3‐1‐1 CALL SYSTEM*

Research Summary: Our paper explores the impact of implementing a nonemergency 3‐1‐1 call system in Baltimore, Maryland. We found a large (34.2%) reduction in 9‐1‐1 calls following the introduction of the 3‐1‐1 nonemergency call system. Many, but not all, of these calls simply migrated over to the 3‐1‐1 call system. Overall, we identified a 7.7% reduction in recorded citizen calls to the police post 3‐1‐1 intervention. This recorded reduction in citizen calls was confounded by an increase in high priority calls to the 9‐1‐1 system (27.5%), a large overall reduction in low priority calls (54.3%), and an estimated increase (perhaps 8%) in unrecorded calls to the police. We also note a small increase in response times to high priority 9‐1‐1 calls following the implementation of the 3‐1‐1 call system and virtually no change in the amount of officer time available for community policing or problem‐oriented policing activities. Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that nonemergency call systems, such as 3‐1‐1, can greatly facilitate police efforts to better handle citizen calls for police service. However, the intrinsic value of nonemergency call systems is tightly woven with a police department's willingness to change dispatch policies (especially for those calls received via the 3‐1‐1 system), reallocate patrol resources, and adopt organizational reforms to support alternative methods (apart from dispatch) for handling nonemergency calls for service.     

HOMICIDE AGAINST THE ELDERLY: A RESEARCH NOTE*

By virtue of the type of data generally used (victim surveys), previous research on the victimization of the elderly is limited in two respects. Not only is the crime of homicide outside the domain of victimization data, but sample surveys uncover too few incidents of victimization of the elderly to permit in-depth analyses. Using the supplementary homicide reports from 1976–1985, we compared patterns and rates of homicide among the elderly and younger populations. Our results suggest that the elderly are in fact the least at risk for homicide generally, as has been reported for other crimes. When examining specific subtypes of homicide, however, the elderly are actually at greater risk than their younger counterparts for homicide committed during a robbery.