Managerialist advocate or “control freak”? The Janus‐faced Office of the Auditor General

Abstract: This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the office's Janus‐like character as both a managerialist advocate and “control freak.” This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge‐basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of “institutional schizophrenia” are identified: the OAG'S mandate in relation to financial and value‐for‐money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAG'S institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the “negative” and “positive” dimensions of the office's mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultant's role of the OAG in relation to VFMA. Sommaire: Le but de cet article est de mettre en relief les contradictions dans le rôle du Bureau du vérificateur général (BVG) et d'identifier les causes et les conséquences du caractére schizoïde du Bureau qui est à la fois partisan du managérialisme et obsédé du contrôle. Ce caractère spécifique du Bureau est façonné par des facteurs institutionnels et le type de connaissance dont il dépend pour remplir sa mission. Trois causes de schizophrénie institutionnelle sont identifées:le mandat du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification financière et l'optimisation des ressources; l'interaction entre la perméabilité institutionnelle du Bureau et la structure du marché du conseil en management; et les tensions entre les dimensions positives et négatives du mandat du Bureau. En ce qui conceme les conséquences, cet article aborde trois aspects:l'incapacité du BVG À développer une position cohérente à l'endroit du managérialisme; le fait que la promotion d'idées managérialistes amène le BVG À s'impliquer dans la sphère politique, et la fragilité du professionalisme en tant que comme mécanisme pour réguler le rôle de consultant du BVG en ce qui concerne la vérification d'optimisation des ressources.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.     

The reciprocal dynamics of organizing and sense‐making in the implementation of major public‐sector reforms

Abstract: Drawing on a longitudinal study from the early years of implementation of health‐care networks in Quebec, this article describes how public‐sector managers deal with complex challenges when both organizational structures and organizational strategies are radically transformed simultaneously. The new organizations studied had to completely re‐shuffle roles and responsibilities of their management teams while making sense of their new mandate of developing a population‐focused approach to health problems – all the time maintaining day‐to‐day operations. The four health‐care networks studied proceeded somewhat differently to meet these reciprocal challenges. The study reveals the importance of balancing organizing initiatives (focused on structures) with “sense‐making” initiatives (focused on strategies), of developing capacities for sense‐making through the creation of key “sense‐maker/sense‐giver” positions whose occupants are able to ensure that conceptual activities engage people working at different levels, even as organizational structures are in flux, and of mobilizing external constraints and influences as opportunities and resources in sense‐making and organizing. Sommaire : Se fondant sur une étude longitudinale des premières années de la mise en œuvre des réseaux de soins de santé au Québec, cet article décrit la manière dont les gestionnaires du secteur public font face à des défis complexes, alors que les structures et les stratégies organisationnelles sont radicalement transformées simultanément. Les nouveaux organismes étudiés ont dû complètement remanier les rôles et les responsabilités de leurs équipes de gestion et comprendre leur nouveau mandat d'élaborer une approche axée sur la population pour ce qui est des problèmes de santé, tout en maintenant leurs activités au jour le jour. Les quatre réseaux de soins de santéétudiés ont travailléà relever ces défis réciproques d'une manière assez différente. L'étude révèle l'importance de trouver un équilibre entre les initiatives consistant à organiser (axées sur les structures) et les initiatives consistant à interpréter les faits (axées sur les stratégies) ; de perfectionner les capacités à interpréter les faits grâce à la création de postes clés d'«interpréteurs de faits», dont les titulaires veilleraient à ce que des activités conceptuelles fassent intervenir les gens travaillant à différents niveaux même lorsque les structures organisationnelles fluctuent continuellement; et enfin de tirer parti des contraintes et influences externes comme autant d'occasions et de ressources pour interpréter et organiser les faits.     

What Do We Mean by ‘Rethinking Regulation’?

This article identifies and discusses several different conceptions of regulatory reform. It subsequently looks at available evidence on trends in regulatory burdens and on the results of regulatory reform activity undertaken over the past 30 years. Thirdly, it identifies and briefly discusses the range of tools that are typically employed in implementing regulatory reform policies. It then examines some of the regulatory problems that implementation of the reform agenda has itself brought forth. It concludes with some comments which seek to assess the report of the Better Regulation Taskforce in the context of the broad overview of regulatory reform set out in the preceding sections of the article.