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Orentlicher D 《Louisiana law review》1999,59(4):1019-1040
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Orentlicher D 《Annals of health law / Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, Institute for Health Law》2010,19(3):449-64, 1 p preceding i
The article examines two primary policy proposals for how the U.S. should allocate its limited health care dollars: a centralized model in which a commission establishes rationing guidelines, and a decentralized model in which rationing decisions are made by health care providers on a case by case basis. The author finds significant advantages with each position, leading the author to assert that a combination of each is key to an effective rationing policy: a centralized control of structure coupled with decentralized physician-level decision making. While mindful that formal rationing guidelines alone are unfeasible to effectuate cost-effective care, the author introduces two decentralized policies to control costs: the limitation of resources at physicians' disposal and elimination of physicians' personal incentive to provide high-cost care. 相似文献
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D Orentlicher 《American journal of law & medicine》1989,15(2-3):184-188
Members of the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Fertility Society, American Medical Women's Association, American Psychiatric Association, and the American Society of Human Genetics have submitted an "amici curiae" brief in support of the appellees of "Webster." The brief did not endorse or oppose the view that the state's interest in fetal health is compelling as fetal viability. Instead, the brief said that: 1) everybody has the right to make medical decisions without the state interfering "up to the point where the state's compelling interest arises;" and 2) even after a compelling interest comes up, state rules must go along with good medical practices. Because some provisions of the Missouri law were not consistent with good medical practice, these provisions were not constitutional. The fetal viability testing requirement would increase risks to the woman and fetus without providing substantial information on viability. The counseling ban would prevent doctors from giving necessary information to pregnant women so that they could make informed decisions. The 1st section of the brief discussed "the medical background of pregnancy and abortion." The earliest age at which a fetus can survive has remained unchanged since "Roe." The medical complications and adverse health effects are fewer from than from childbirth. Abortions have become safer. The brief said that the "right of privacy" is broad enough so that a woman could decide whether or not to end her pregnancy. In "Roe," the Court found that if a woman was going to make a choice about pregnancy, this was the same as other private decisions which are protected in the Constitution. Individual medical decision making is "deeply rooted" in US "history and tradition." Accepted principles are reflected in the fact that the patient has a right to make these decisions based on the "liberty component of the Due Process Clause." Section 188.029 of the Missouri Law would make a doctor do certain tests for fetal viability. They would have no medical value, in most cases, and put a risk on the health of the mother. It was not related to any goal of the state, and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Section 188-205 of Missouri law - which says a doctor can't consult unless the mother's life is endangered was also unconstitutional. 相似文献
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Orentlicher D 《University of Illinois law review》1998,1998(3):837-859
Richard Epstein, in his book Mortal Peril, supports euthanasia and assisted suicide and rejects the distinction between them and withdrawal treatment. In this essay, Professor Orentlicher argues that Epstein is correct in finding no meaningful moral distinction between euthanasia and treatment withdrawal, examines the reasons why the distinction has persisted in American jurisprudence, and explains why the distinction has eroded. Epstein also concludes in his book that there is no constitutional right to euthanasia or assisted suicide. Professor Orentlicher's response is that constitutionality is not the appropriate inquiry; rather, the better question is whether to recognize a right to assisted suicide once a right to euthanasia in the form of terminal sedation already exists. He answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that assisted suicide enhances patient welfare and reduces risks of abuse in a world with euthanasia. 相似文献