RULING ELITE MODELS: A CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE

Abstract. The argument that theories of elite rule are'unrealistic'and 'straw men', is rejected, and the need for such ideal-type models is demonstrated on methodological grounds. The classic ruling elite model associated with Mosca and Michels is shown to be grossly deficient. Robert Dahl's approach is critically examined. An alternative ruling elite model is proposed, and its advantages in terms of a broad theory of political power and of its methodological and empirical application, are analysed. Finally, the research implications of this alternative model are presented.     

ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND THE MARKET: THE CASE OF COMMUNITY CARE

The UK government has introduced fundamental reforms into the provision of social care. The'community care'programme, which was fully implemented in 1993, requires local authorities to assess the needs of potential users, to design an individual package of care that reflects those needs, and to purchase the package from a range of statutory, voluntary and private providers. Thus the new arrangement introduced a'quasi-market'in community care, along the lines of those already operating in other areas of the UK public sector, such as health and education. Hitherto, much analysis of the functioning of such markets has been conducted within a neo-classical economic framework. This article examines the relevance to the complex new community care market of three alternative theoretical perspectives: the transaction costs literature, the Austrian school and the new economic sociology. It is concluded that, although neoclassical economic discourse has been influential in shaping policy, no single perspective can capture all the issues relevant to analysing the market in community care. Therefore, in evaluating the reforms, an eclectic theoretical approach will be required which draws upon a variety of economic discourses.     

Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance

This article explores means by which non-governmental institutions and resources, both commercial and voluntay, may be enlisted in the interest of regulatory compliance. Following a discussion of non-governmental social control, it reviews the basic institutional forms of indirect governance through which third-party “co-production” of compliance might occur. It then discusses the basic issues which arise when certain public functions are delegated to or devolve upon private interests, and suggests safeguards which might be put in place to enhance the advantages and to minimize the adverse consequences of such devolution. The conclusion seeks to articulate basic principles for the mobilization of third parties in furtherance of compliance, and to encourage the idea of a more participative regulatoy process.     

Just the Ticket? The Labour Party's Deputy Leadership Election of 2007

Although there were six contenders for Labour's Deputy Leadership contest, it was conducted with remarkably little personal animosity. Nor, for the most part, were there substantive policy differences between the challengers, with the notable exception of the Iraq War. Instead, there was a clear determination to 'move on' from Blairism, and an acknowledgement that changes or new priorities were now necessary in key areas of policy, albeit without lurching to the Left or reviving 'Old Labour'. As such, the main differences between the candidates derived from their differing perceptions of the role of the Deputy Leader, and what they would each contribute to the post if elected. The ballot also revealed the manner in which support for the six contenders varied across the three sections of Labour's electoral college, so that each candidate tended to be more popular among one section of the Party, but enjoyed less support from the other two sections.     

Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behaviour

Abstract. The traditional class approach to politics maintains that the working class 'naturally' votes for left-wing parties because they represent its economic interests. Such traditional voting patterns have, however, become less typical, giving rise to the 'Death of Class Debate' in political sociology. Against this background, using data collected in the Netherlands in 1997, this article examines why so many people, working and middle class alike, vote for parties that do not represent their 'real class interests'. Critically elaborating Lipset's work on working-class authoritarianism and Inglehart's on postmaterialism, the article confirms that 'natural' voting complies with the logic of class analysis. 'Unnatural' voting, however, is not driven by economic cues and class. Right-wing working-class voting behaviour is caused by cultural conservatism that stems from limited cultural capital. The pattern of voting for the two small leftist parties in Dutch politics underscores the significance of this cultural explanation: those with limited cultural capital and culturally conservative values vote for the Socialist Party ('Old Left') rather than the Greens ('New Left'). Breaking the traditional monopoly of the one-sided class approach and using a more eclectic and open theoretical approach enables political sociologists once again to appreciate the explanatory power of the class perspective.