Value orientation, left-right placement and voting

Abstract. In this article we try to disentangle the constraints between traditional lines of political polarization (left-right placement) and newer distinctions (materialist/postmaterialist values) among mass publics. It is shown that voting or party preference is most clearly related to the left-right placement of the respondents. However, this placement is directly and strongly dependent on the materialist/postmaterialist orientation, while background variables like education, income and age are linked to voting via this value orientation. The materialist/postmaterialist orientation appears to be the present-day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in advanced industrial society. Although alignments and orientations count for a substantive part of the variance in voting, the power of these models to predict the actual vote of people turns out to be rather poor.     

Vicarious Trauma in Judges: The Personal Challenge of Dispensing Justice

Symptoms of vicarious trauma, coping strategies, and prevention suggestions were investigated with 105 judges. Participants completed a self‐report measure developed for this study. The majority of judges (63%) reported one or more symptoms that they identified as work‐related vicarious trauma experiences. Female judges reported more symptoms, as did judges with seven or more years of experience. In addition, female judges were more likely to report internalizing difficulties, while judges with more experience reported higher levels of externalizing/hostility symptoms. Coping and prevention strategies were multi‐domain (i.e., personal, professional, and societal) and underscored the need for greater awareness and support for judges.     

DESISTING DISTANCE DECAY: ON THE AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL CRIME TRIPS*

The distance-decay function suggests a spatial pattern of criminal activity whereby most crimes are committed nearer rather than farther from the criminals' own homes. Presumably, the farther away the target, the lower the chances of crimes. The reason usually offered for this general pattern is an individual one: The costs to the criminal in terms of time, energy, and money increases with distance. We contend that it may be misleading to draw inferences about individuals from the aggregated decay function because it conceals individual variations in ranges of operation. This argument is supported by data randomly generated by the computer that show that even when individual criminals increase their crime rate with increasing distance, a distance-decay function still emerges at the aggregate level. This is not to say that an individual-level distance-decay function does not exist, only that it must be demonstrated by data at the individual level because distance-decay effects can characterize aggregate behavior even in the absence of individual distance decay.     

STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of ‘street‐level bureaucracy’ was coined by Michael Lipsky (1980) as the common denominator for what would become a scholarly theme. Since then his stress on the relative autonomy of professionals has been complemented by the insight that they are working in a micro‐network of relations, in varying contexts. The conception of ‘governance’ adds a particular aspect to this: the multi‐dimensional character of a policy system as a nested sequence of decisions. Combining these views casts a different perspective on the ways street‐level bureaucrats are held accountable. In this article some axiomatic assumptions are drawn from the existing literature on the theme of street‐level bureaucracy and on the conception of governance. Acknowledging variety, and arguing for contextualized research, this results in a rethinking of the issue of accountability at the street level.     

The liberalisation of capital movements and financial services in the European single market: A case study in regulation

Abstract. The creation of a common market in capital is a basic component of the European Community's single market programme. This article provides an explanation of the factors which have shaped the single market for capital in terms of three 'perspectives' which supplement each other and which collectively provide a substantive explanation. These perspectives include: (i) the policy requirements and politico-economic context of the single market programme; (ii) the complex and multi-faceted nature of regulation in the financial services field; and (iii) the political balance of power between the national, EC and international agencies involved in financial regulation. Each of these three perspectives contributes salient insights unavailable to the other two. Collectively they provide an explanation of how the liberalisation of capital movements and financial services has actually involved creating a more sophisticated regulatory order rather than simply reducing the volume of regulation.