Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to the Defense Department in the Post‐9–11 Period

The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Congress have long been argued by defense leadership. It is an important issue because of its relevance to congressional assessment of defense management, budget priorities, and how to enforce policy preferences. This paper investigates the series of supplemental appropriations for the war on terrorism to determine (a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to defense, (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us about the evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the Defense Department.     

THE DEMISE OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY

Books reviewed in this article: Book Reviewed in this article: Shortly after this article was completed and accepted for publication, Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In order to understand and appreciate the significant implications of the new legislation, it is first necessary to review the legislative and litigation history of disparate impact discussed here. Immediately following is a legislative update entitled “The Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory?”