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Frans VAN WINDEN Arthur SCHRAM Fons GROOT 《European Journal of Political Research》1987,15(2):185-202
Abstract. In this article simulation results are used to analyze the capacity of a general politico-economic model, developed by one of the authors, to generate cycles of various lengths. The model describes behaviour of individuals and organizations in the economic as well as the political sphere. The interaction between both spheres gives rise to short term (business) cycles as well as long term (Kondratieff) cycles. The analyses concentrate on the effect variations in the political sector (regarding, e.g., party identification on non-economic grounds, the sensitivity of voters, and the discount parameter for past economic results) have on the cycles found. 相似文献
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154.
The address that follows was given by the South African HighCommissioner at a joint meeting of the Royal African Societyand the Royal Commonwealth Society on April 2, 1959, Sir PercivaleLiesching, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., former U. K. High Commissionerin South, Africa, took the chair. 相似文献
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A. CARL Le VAN 《管理》2011,24(1):31-53
Power‐sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa as paths out of civil war. However, the research focus on conflict mitigation provides an inadequate guide to recent cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. When used in response to flawed elections, pacts guaranteeing political inclusion adversely affect government performance and democratization. Political inclusion in these cases undermines vertical relationships of accountability, increases budgetary spending, and creates conditions for policy gridlock. Analysis using three salient dimensions highlights these negative effects: Origin distinguishes extra‐constitutional pacts from coalitions produced by more stable institutions, function contrasts postwar cases from scenarios where the state itself faces less risk, and time horizon refers to dilemmas that weigh long‐term costs versus short‐term benefits. The conclusion suggests that the drawbacks of inclusive institutions can be moderated by options such as sunset clauses, evenhanded prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executive authority. 相似文献