The size of the SOE sector and macroeconomic performance: an empirical study based on Chinese provincial data

Using a neoclassical growth model augmented with human capital, we investigate the impact of the presence of state owned enterprises (SOEs) on macroeconomic performance in China, using provincial data from 1990 to 2004. We estimate a macroeconomic model with panel methods to explain changes in labor productivity resulting from standard influences as well as presence of the SOE sector measured in five different ways. While controlling for growth in the labor force and physical capital, government size, exposure to trade and change in economic structure, we conclude that the relative share of the SOE sector has no significant influence on macroeconomic performance in China during our sample period.     

Genotyping the future: scientists' expectations about race/ ethnicity after BiDil

The ongoing debate about the FDA approval of BiDil in 2005 demonstrates how the first racially/ethnically licensed drug is entangled in both Utopian and dystopian future visions about the continued saliency of race/ethnicity in science and medicine. Drawing on the sociology of expectations, this paper analyzes how scientists in the field of pharmacogenetics are constructing certain visions of the future with respect to the use of social categories of race/ethnicity and the impact of high-throughput genotyping technologies that promise to transform scientific practices.     

An effective punishment scheme to reduce extramarital affairs: an economic approach

By using a dynamic stochastic optimization model, this paper shows that the existence of punishment does not necessarily deter extramarital affairs. This study may help to explain why extramarital affairs are a common phenomenon in most societies even though punishment exists. This study also has an implication for family laws: extramarital affairs can be effectively reduced if the legal punishment scheme is designed in the way that makes the adulterer’s expected loss increase with the level of adultery at an increasing or constant rate.      

The legacy of Bismarck

Many mechanisms (such as auctions) efficiently allocate an asset to the firm which values it most highly. But sometimes the asset’s owner may benefit from the transfer only if the asset is not too valuable to potential buyers. In this setting, we examine the efficiency of mechanisms when the potential buyers have private information about the asset’s value. We show that rent seeking, and lobbying, rather than merely wasting resources, can lead to allocations which are close to efficient.