The Gambling Act 2005: Regulatory Containment and Market Control

The Act marks a fundamental shift from legislative to market control of gambling. While plans for Las Vegas style casinos and internet gambling sites in Britain have suffered setbacks, restrictions on the availability, advertising and stimulation of demand for gambling, enshrined in the Gaming Act 1968, have been abandoned. In their place, a new regulatory body, the Gambling Commission, has been established to take primary responsibility for ensuring that three licensing objectives are promoted. These objectives are the prevention of crime and disorder, the conduct of gambling in a fair and open way and the protection of children and the vulnerable. The Commission has been given strong and wide ranging powers to regulate gambling, but can the safeguards proposed meet the challenge presented by a gambling industry released from restraints?     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.