Governance without a state: Can it work?

In this article we explore how much state is necessary to make governance work. We begin by clarifying concepts of governance and the “shadow of hierarchy” and we follow this clarification with a brief overview of empirical findings on governance research in developed countries. We then discuss the dilemmas for governance in areas of limited statehood, where political institutions are too weak to hierarchically adopt and enforce collectively binding rules. While prospects for effective policymaking appear to be rather bleak in these areas, we argue that governance research has consistently overlooked the existence of functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy. We assert that governance with(out) government can work even in the absence of a strong shadow of hierarchy, we identify functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, and we discuss to what extent they can help overcome issues of legitimacy and effectiveness in areas of limited statehood.     

Determinants of inflationary performance: Corporatist structures vs. central bank autonomy

Thanks go to John Aldrich, Robert Bates, William Bernhard, Richard Burdekin, Henry Chappel, Dudley Wallace and Thomas Willett for suggestions and to Ted Smith for computational assistance.     

THE MARKET FOR INDUSTRY: WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TREAD?

This paper investigates one of the perennial mysteries in the area of state and local finance, the provision of tax and other subsidies to business by federal, state and local governments in the face of solid evidence that such incentives do little to nothing to influence business location or job creation. The paper looks at the upsurge in such governmental aid in the last decade and considers whether this upsurge has occurred because such aid is more efficacious than it used to be or whether it has occurred for political reasons unrelated to its effectiveness.