Men and women's attributions of blame for domestic violence

Attributions of blame for the first and latest episodes of violence were assessed in a sample of 139 couples who were referred to a mandatory domestic violence treatment program in the military. Use of a methodology which allows for reports of nonmutually exclusive categories of attribution from both members of the dyad revealed more complex patterns of attributions than reflected in the existing literature. In addition, there were low rates of agreement within couples as to who was to blame for the violence. Although both men and women exhibited a high frequency of blaming their partner for both episodes of violence, men were significantly more likely to blame themselves for the latest than for the first episode. Attributions of blame were related to contextual variables in both men and women. Sex specific relationships emerged. These results were discussed with specific reference to predictions derived from attribution theory and their clinical implications.     

Reforming the United Nations: New Proposals in a Long-Lasting Endeavor

Netherlands International Law Review -     

When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem-solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.     

US Presidential popularity and opportunities to coerce North Korea: a quantitative test 1990 2000

This paper investigates how North Korean behaviour towards boththe United States and South Korea is influenced by the popularityof the American President. The study applies theories relatingto strategic conflict avoidance and signalling to suggest thatthe American President is able to demonstrate a willingnessto use force when he is unpopular and as such is better ableto coerce Pyongyang. Using a time-series model, I demonstratethat the North Koreans become more cooperative towards the UnitedStates in response to decreases in presidential popularity andincreasing levels of US inflation. However, the study also showsthat the North Koreans do not alter their behaviour towardsthe South Koreans in response to low American President Popularityratings. The research, therefore, suggests that the North Koreansbelieve that the United States would be unable to launch a diversionaryattack in response to North Korean behaviour towards the South.This study provides a clear support for the strategic avoidanceof conflict hypothesis and suggests that the American Presidentsare best able to coerce North Korea when they are unpopularat home. Received for publication August 31, 2005. Accepted for publication December 21, 2005.