Democracy and economy in Africa: The optimists and the pessimists

Democratization has come relatively late to Africa, but it has swept the continent which hitherto had mostly known only a brief period of liberal democracy immediately after independence. The pressure for democratization has come from the international community with the end of the cold war; and has been encouraged by aid conditionality; and from the peoples of Africa who have felt abused and repressed by other forms of rule in the intervening years. The survival of democracy is however far from assured: there are a number of arguments in its favour, but also a series of political problems. In addition democratization comes after a decade of economic hardship that has left Africa as the poorest continent in the world. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have promoted Structural Adjustment Programmes, (SAPS) but the international economic environment is generally hostile for Africa's development and structural adjustment has had only limited success. Thus in addition to the political problems of democratization, it is taking place in a harsh economic environment which could contribute to the long term undermining of the enterprise.     

Terrorism in the federal republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the ‘68 movement or ‘burden of fascism’?

In Italy and in the German Federal Republic rebel movements occurred in political cultures where the burden of Fascism shapes patterns of perceptions and orientations. The movements are seen as particularly threatening and this elicits a very aggressive response. On the other hand, the movement in its turn interprets this response as a residue of the Fascist past or as a correspondingly aggressive manner. This configuration creates a special escalation dynamic. German and Italian Fascism differed fundamentally and that difference is also displayed in the struggles which began two decades after Fascism was destroyed.     

Elected or Selected? The Continuing Constitutional Conundrum of House of Lords Reform

The 1911 Parliament Act decreed that Lords reform was ‘an urgent question which brooks no delay’, yet the subsequent 112 years have witnessed only sporadic and inchoate reforms. The issue has invariably suffered both from interparty disagreement between the Conservatives and Labour and, more importantly, intraparty disagreements owing to the divergent views and irreconcilable disagreements among Labour MPs over ‘what is to be done?’, and recognition that any reform which enhanced the legitimacy of the second chamber would threaten the pre-eminence of the House of Commons and a Labour government therein. A similar fate is likely to befall the Labour Party's latest proposal for replacing the current House of Lords with an elected second chamber. Meanwhile, the Conservative peer, Lord Norton, is seeking to place the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) on a statutory basis and impose stricter criteria on prime ministerial nominations for peerages. Yet, this would still leave any Prime Minister with considerable powers of patronage in appointing members of the second chamber. This article therefore suggests that a Prime Minister should only be permitted to nominate 20 per cent of the membership, with the rest appointed via HOLAC itself, thereby depoliticising the process as far as practicably possible, and imbuing it with greater public trust.     

The United Nations and the right to self‐determination: A response to Mahalingam's reply

France has had a long history of struggle with various forms of terrorism and over the past decade has achieved particular success against Algerian Islamic terrorist groups – the GIA and GSPC – with close links to Al-Qaeda. This article reviews France's experience of terrorism since the end of the Second World War and details the evolving state responses to these challenges and the sophisticated anti-terrorist apparatus that now serves the French state. It then considers the role of France in the post-11 September ‘war on terrorism’ and argues that France remains in the front-line of the struggle against Al-Qaeda and that the French experience has much to contribute to the international war against Islamic terrorism.     

Gibraltar at the United Nations: Caught Between a Treaty,the Charter and the “Fundamentalism” of the Special Committee

On account of Spain's long-standing claim to the sovereignty of the British Overseas Territory of Gibraltar, “the Rock” remains one of sixteen non-self-governing territories on the United Nations list awaiting decolonization. This article examines the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity adopted by the United Nations in consideration of the issue of decolonization as they have been applied to Gibraltar, together with the consequences for the parties concerned. With the fiftieth anniversary of the first United Nations Resolution on decolonization on the horizon and the recent adoption by Gibraltar of what is considered to be a non-colonial constitution, the article suggests that it is timely for the United Nations to consider taking a more flexible approach to Gibraltar's status that would put to one side Spain's claim but allow Gibraltar to be removed from the UN list.     

The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora

The inability of the United States to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and many of his top deputies at Tora Bora is widely recognized as one of the most significant missed opportunities of America's struggle with al Qaeda. However, the debate over U.S. actions at Tora Bora during Operation Enduring Freedom lacks in-depth analysis, especially concerning the commonly offered solution of more U.S. troops on the ground. This paper dissects the original operation against al Qaeda forces entrenched in the mountain complex in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001 and its impact on the debate over the Afghan model of warfare. An alternative plan involving U.S. conventional forces is presented that takes into account the considerable constraints of the scenario and analyzes the key make-or-break points of the operation. Although the challenges are far greater than most critics have allowed, the revised plan would likely have offered the best chance to capture or kill Bin Laden and a significant portion of the al Qaeda leadership.