The Rule of Law Beyond Thick and Thin

In this paper it is argued that different understandings of the requirements of the Rule of Law can to a large extent be explained by the position taken with regard to two interrelated distinctions. On the one hand, the Rule of Law can be regarded as either a principle of law or as a principle of governance. On the other hand, the requirements of the Rule of Law can be regarded as defining either a minimum standard which something has to meet in order to be law or as an aspirational standard identifying what it means to be good law. In combination these two distinctions define a range of perspectives on the nature of the Rule of Law that are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.     

Duff on the Legitimacy of Punishment of Socially Deprived Offenders

Duff offered an argument for the conclusion that just or legitimate punishment of socially deprived offenders in our unjust society is impossible. One of the claims in his argument is that our courts have the standing to blame an offender only if our polity has the right to do so since our courts are acting as the representatives of, or to use the exact phrases by Duff, “in the name of”, or “on behalf of”, the whole polity. In this paper I will challenge that claim. I will argue that the courts can be seen as acting, not on behalf of the whole polity, but only on behalf of a subset of its citizens, namely, the just citizens (i.e. the citizens who cannot be seen to have wronged the deprived offenders).     

"Das sind meine Prinzipien. Ich habe auch andere."

Bei Rechtsgutachten von Universitätsangehörigen stellen sich - insbesondere hinsichtlich der Offenlegung von AuftraggeberInnen - wissenschaftsethische Fragen, die in Selbstregulierungsinstrumenten der akademischen Gemeinschaft adressiert werden sollten.