Price discrimination in a rent-seeking economy

This paper examines the incentive and the consequences of using discriminatory pricing by a monopolist in a rent-seeking economy. It is shown that, even if all consumer groups' demands have identical elasticities at any given price, the monopolist has an incentive to charge a lower price to high pressure consumer groups so as to alleviate their rent-seeking efforts in challenging its monopolistic power. Furthermore, it is shown that by allowing the firm to price discriminate total welfare may increase, even if all rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful.     

To fight or not to fight?

Public Choice - This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to “struggle” and when to “subjugate”? Analysing...     

The median voter hypothesis: Evidence from general purpose local governments

The median voter hypothesis (MVH) represents a much-used as well as much-criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists. To evaluate the MVH, this paper applies the Cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments. The Cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the MVH and all tested models, thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical MVH analyses. The test results reveal that the MVH is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments, but not specific services. Further, the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical MVH performance.     

Internal Controls in State, Local, and Nonprofit Agencies

This study analyzes 127 cases of losses of internal accounting controls in state, local, and nonprofit agencies in North Carolina. The reasons for losses in control are identified and discussed along with ways of preventing such incidents.     

Do Candidates Matter? Constituency-specific Vote Changes for Incumbent MPs, 1983–1987

The assumption that candidates make a difference to electoral outcomes in British general elections is tested through a comparison of the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Incumbent's Constituency-specific Vote Change (ICVC) between the June 1983 and June 1987 British general elections is measured by subtracting the average regional vote change for the incumbent's party from the constituency vote change registered by the incumbent. Regression analysis finds ICVC to be most significantly influenced in both the Labour and Conservative parties by the incumbent's length of tenure, displayed especially in the higher ICVC registered by first-term incumbents than by more senior incumbents. Variables indicating the security or insecurity of the seat in electoral terms are significantly related to ICVC in the Conservative but not in the Labour case. The findings for Labour indicate ICVC to be greater where electoral security is greater. This finding might be explained by successful Conservative party concentration on constituencies in which Labour incumbents appear to be vulnerable.     

Tax Design and The Meddling Factor: Lessons From Hawaii's Liquor Tax

Tax design decisions are subject to many influences, including economic and political realities. Those who make tax policy at the state level are under constant pressure to modify taxes and tax structures at the margin. In making their decisions, policy makers must assess and weigh the often conflicting advice that results from varying outlooks and interests among, as well as within, the groups providing such input.
Using Hawaii's liquor tax as a case study, this paper illustrates how seemingly innocuous policy meddling can turn a good tax into a bad one. The events that led the Hawaii Legislature to decide to substitute a flawed gallonage levy for a successful ad valorem tax are reviewed. The relative merits of ad valorem and per-unit liquor taxes are discussed. Implications of adoption of the gallonage tax are presented. Finally, the article discusses the reasons why meddling may be attractive to both taxpayers and those who levy the tax, and it concludes that tax design criteria should include disincentives to meddle as a reasonable principle of taxation.     

Partisanship and the party system

The defining properties of party identification long established for the United States fail with some frequency to be replicated in electoral systems abroad. A number of plausible suggestions have been made to account for this system-level variability: Most of these have some face merit, but none taken alone is adequate to provide a full cross-system explanation. Variation in party system size or fractionalization has recently been discussed as another source of differential dynamics of party loyalties. Unfortunately, the conventional means of assessing party identification properties are subject to rather severe artifacts, typically ignored, when comparisons are made across systems of very different party size. The conceptual stakes underlying key methods options for such comparisons—most notably, between continuous and discrete statistical tools—are examined. The use of continuous statistics for systems of very multiple parties rests on an assumption that voters do in some degree regard these party systems as imbedded in a continuous space. A simple test for this assumption is mounted in four systems and unsurprisingly it shows very clear support. Analysis of residuals beyond this obvious result add several points of less obvious information about the distribution of party affect in such systems.