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Peter Rutland, The politics of economic stagnation in the Soviet Union. The role of local party organs in economic management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, xv + 297 pp., £40.00.
Saul Estrin & Martin Cave, eds, Competition and Competition Policy. London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, xi + 143 pp., £35.00.
Pekka Sutela, ed., The Russian Economy in Crisis and Transition. Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1993, 192 pp., no price.
Sheila M. Puffer, ed., The Russian Management Revolution: Preparing Managers for the Market Economy. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1992, xxi + 290 pages, $59.95 h/b, $19.95 p/b.
Alan Smith, Russia and the World Economy: Problems of Integration. London: Routledge, 1993, 253 pp., £37.50 h/b, £12.99 p/b.
Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Baltic Independence and Russian Empire. London: Macmillan, 1991, xxii + 346 pp., £45.00.
John Fitzmaurice, The Baltic—A Regional Future? New York, St Martin's Press Inc., 1992, xi + 171 pp., £35.00.
Jan Arveds Trapans, ed., Toward Independence. The Baltic Popular Movements, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, CA, Oxford, Westview Press/Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1991, 166 pp., £18.95.
Henryk J. Flakierski, Income Inequalities in the Former Soviet Union and its Republics. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, vii + 87 pp., $24.95 p/b.
Jan Winiecki, Post‐Soviet‐Type Economies in Transition. Aldershot: Avebury, 1993, v + pp. £35.00.
Roger Clarke, Ed., Privatisation: An International Symposium. Papers and Discussion from a Conference in Bled, Slovenia, 6–9 February 1992. London: The Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 1992, 133 pp., £6.50.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, xx + 264 pp., $13.95 p/b.
Sharin Rai, Hilary Pilkington & Annie Phizacklea, eds, Women in the Face of Change: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. London: Routledge, 1992, x + 227 pp., £10.99 p/b.
Bertram Silverman, Robert Vogt & Murray Yanowitch, eds, Labor and Democracy in the Transition to a Market System: A US‐Post‐Soviet Dialogue. Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992, xxii + 228 pp., $59.95 h/b, $19.95 p/b.
David Shepherd, Beyond Metafiction. Self‐Consciousness in Soviet Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, xii + 260 pp., £30.00.
Donald D. Barry, ed., with the assistance of Louis Rodriguez, Toward the ‘Rule of Law’ in Russia? Political and Legal Reform in the Transition Period. Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992, xxv + 402 pp., $90.00.
Hugh D. Phillips, Between the Revolution and the West: A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, xii + 244 pp., £19.95.
Kitty Weaver, Bushels of Rubles. Soviet Youth in Transition, Westport, & London CT: Praeger, 1993, vii + 216 pp., £40.50. 相似文献
This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.
Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.
Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.
How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.
The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.
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