Honesty in Environmental Compliance Games

This note investigates the consequences of honesty in a compliance game involving polluting firms and an environmental agency. Two enforcement schemes with or without self-reporting of behavior are considered. First, we show that non intervention may become optimal when the proportion of honest polluters is large enough but still inferior to one. Secondly, the increase in the number of honest polluters has striking ambiguous effects on pollution and social welfare. Indeed, we give examples in which an increase in the proportion of honest polluters leads to an increase in the number of non compliant polluters or a decrease in social welfare.     

Evaluation in France,a Component of Territorial Public Action

Evaluation practices developed in France, especially by local authorities and above all by regional councils, provide an interesting opportunity to examine from the inside the way public policies are constructed. Taking evaluation practices seriously as a subject of study reminds us, in a way, of the necessary empiricism needed to analyse public policies. At a time when this discipline experiences, at least in France, a surge in conceptual proposals, the point of view expressed here aims to point out the necessary modesty we have to show in the face of the complexity of the subjects studied and of the usefulness of evaluation practices to explain territorial public policies.     

环境规制对企业有好处吗——对波特假说的一个检验

传统观点认为环境规制对受环境污染的企业有负面影响,但波特(假说)宣称受污染的企业能从环境政策中受益,因为设计良好的环境规制能通过提高生产率或增加产品价值来激励创新,实现个体利益,最终环境规制能使社会和被规制企业都受益。波特假说被政策制定者和通俗刊物所接受,但受到部分经济学家的严厉批评。在本文中,Ambec和Barla列举了这场争论中的主要观点,展示了波特假说的理论基础,进而对迄今为止经济学领域一些适用的经验性证据进行评价。     

Trajectories of Administrative Reform: Institutions,Timing and Choices in France and Spain

The influence of national administrative institutions on contemporary reforms has often been noted but insufficiently tested. This article enriches the comparative perspective of administrative reform policies by focusing on four interrelated dimensions: the choices of reformers, institutional constraints, timing and sequencing and long-term trajectories. This article tries to determine whether most similar administrative systems exhibit analogous contemporary reform trajectories in content, timing and sequence. By comparing the administrative reform policies of two ‘most similar’ Napoleonic countries, France and Spain, this article analyses the commonalities and divergences of decentralisation, territorial state reorganisation, civil service reforms and policies that focus on performance management and organisational design. The article identifies the ‘causal mechanisms’ that characterise the specific role of institutions and considers both the role of context and the importance of policy intersections.