Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in the EC Legal System

Abstract:  This article contrasts species of regulatory and tax arbitrage with the ECJ's approach to abuse of rights. Its aim is to explain the concepts, describe their relationship and identify the legal and policy issues which they raise within the EC legal system. Arbitrage and abuse figure prominently in the ECJ's case-law, especially on the freedom of movement. In its more recent case-law, the ECJ has adopted a more developed approach to abuse of rights by laying down a two-prong test. This article seeks to draw legal and policy conclusions by examining inter alia the virtues and vices of the EC doctrine of abuse of rights.     

Reducing inpatient hospital costs: an attempt at Medicaid reform in Illinois

While California's Medi-Cal program and Arizona's Health Care Cost Containment System have been subject to scholarly analysis, little has been written about a similar attempt at competitive bidding under Medicaid by Illinois. This article describes the process of implementing the Illinois Competitive Access and Reimbursement Equity (ICARE) program signed into law in 1984. The article examines hospital data and access implications for recipients and compares the Illinois program with other Medicaid contracting programs. A more thoughtful process of policy implementation is urged for such reform attempts in Medicaid.     

Controlling federal expenditures in the national school lunch program: The relationship between changes in household eligibility and federal policy

Under the assumption of widespread fraud and abuse, procedures were implemented in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) in 1981 to detect and deter misreporting by applicants for subsidized meal benefits. We, however, find that the incidence of fraud is actually small relative to normal temporal variation in income and household composition that leads to legitimate changes in eligibility for benefits. It is estimated that each month about 3 percent of all households approved for meal benefits have changes sufficiently large to alter their benefit status. Further, the amount of misreporting at the time of application, estimated to be 4.8 percent, is far smaller than previously assumed. Instead of focusing on the static problem of deterring initial applicant misreporting, the policy problem is now a dynamic one that includes how (or whether) to deal with normal changes in income and household size.