Characterization and validation studies of powerPlex 2.1, a nine-locus short tandem repeat (STR) multiplex system and penta D monoplex

In order to increase the power of discrimination for human identification purposes, a nine-locus short tandem repeat (STR) multiplex, the GenePrint PowerPlex 2.1 system (PowerPlex 2.1) developed by Promega Corporation and a separate pentanucleotide-repeat locus, Penta D, were tested. This megaplex system includes the highly polymorphic loci FGA, TPOX, D8S1179, vWA, Penta E, D18S51, D21S11, TH01, and D3S1358 and may be used in combination with the eight-locus STR multiplex, the GenePrint PowerPlex 1.1 system (PowerPlex 1.1) that has been previously developed. Three of the loci, TPOX, TH01 and vWA, have been included in both systems for quality control purposes. As with PowerPlex 1.1, PowerPlex 2.1 is also based on a two-color detection of fluorescent-labeled DNA products amplified by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and provides a valuable tool for accurate and rapid allele determination. The primer sequences used in the PowerPlex 2.1/Penta D system are also presented in this report. To meet the "Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories" (FBI), we tested the efficiency and reproducibility of the PowerPlex 2.1/PentaD system by several validation studies that were conducted as a joint project among seven laboratories. Validation tests included concordance studies, sensitivity, and species specificity determination, as well as performance in forensic and environmentally impacted samples. The results produced from these tests demonstrated the consistency and reliability of the PowerPlex 2.1/Penta D system.     

Homeland Security: The Difference between a Vision and a Wish

The U.S. government is considering how it should reorganize for homeland security. Consequently, attention has focused on the new Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Much debate focuses on two issues related to OHS: (1) whether the OHS should be a separate executive agency; and (2) whether the OHS director has sufficient authority to direct changes in policies and resource allocation of other departments and agencies. The authors believe the emphasis on these areas of interest is misplaced as measures of the eventual success of the OHS. Rather than focusing on these political issues, this article outlines several questions about how the OHS might approach its complex mission and highlights some organizational and bureaucratic realities that are likely to survive the debate over placement of the OHS within the executive branch and the authorities of the OHS director. This article concludes with a discussion of some organizational tools that the OHS or any coordinating office will require to fulfill its mandate.     

Understanding the Islamic State’s competitive advantages: Remaking state and nationhood in the Middle East and North Africa

While many researchers have examined the evolution and unique characteristics of the Islamic State (IS), taking an IS-centric approach has yet to illuminate the factors allowing for its establishment in the first place. To provide a clearer explanation for IS’s successes and improve analysts’ ability to predict future occurrences of similar phenomena, we analyze IS’s competitive advantages through the lens of two defining structural conditions in the Middle East North Africa (MENA): failure of state institutions and nationhood. It is commonly understood that the MENA faces challenges associated with state fragility, but our examination of state and national resiliency shows that Syria and Iraq yield the most deleterious results in the breakdown of the nation, suggesting that the combined failure of state and nation, as well as IS’s ability to fill these related vacuities, is a significant reason IS thrives there today. Against this backdrop, we provide a model of IS’s state- and nation-making project, and illustrate IS’s clear competitive advantages over all other state and non-state actors in both countries, except for Kurdish groupings. We conclude with recommendations on how policy-makers may begin halting and reversing the failure of both state and nation in Iraq and Syria.     

At the Movies: A Continuing Dialogue on the Challenges of Teaching with Film

As part of ISP's ongoing effort to provide a scholarly venue for the exchange of ideas on a variety of topics, this issue's ISP Forum presents one set of reactions to the February 2001 article by Lynn Kuzma and Patrick Haney titled "And Action . . . ! Using Film to Learn About Foreign Policy" (February 2001:33-50). Vincent Pollard's comments represent what we hope will be the first in a series of comments on teaching international studies with film. Profs. Kuzma and Haney in their rejoinder urge for an ongoing discussion of the topic, as they see the use of film growing in the field. More broadly, the Editors of ISP invite readers to submit their own comments and reactions on this and other pieces that appear within the pages of ISP. Please note that all submissions undergo a peer review process.     

Information terrorism: Political violence in the information age

Information warfare represents a threat to American national security and defense. There are two general methods in which a terrorist might employ an information terrorist attack: (1) when information technology (IT) is a target, and/or (2) when IT is the tool of a larger operation. The first method would target an information system for sabotage, either electronic or physical, thus destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any information infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependent upon it. The second would manipulate and exploit an information system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function for which it was not meant (such as spoofing air traffic control). A perennial dilemma of combating terrorism in a democratic society is finding the right balance between civil liberties and civil security. The special problems associated with IT are examined. The US national security establishment needs to use a flexible, integrated response to counter information terrorists ‐ one which employs information warfare tactics tailored to counter gray‐area phenomena, but which also pools resources from ‘conventional’ counter‐terrorism and law enforcement authorities.