REMOVING THE CULTURAL AND MANAGERIAL BARRIERS IN PROJECT‐TO‐PROJECT LEARNING: A CASE FROM THE UK PUBLIC SECTOR

Project‐based initiatives form a major part of government investment and, so, learning from past projects should be a major concern for public sector organizations. Previous research has explored systems and processes for project‐based learning but little research has examined the social and cultural factors that enable this learning to be applied with useful effect. This paper reports on two successive major UK government projects. The introduction of independent learning accounts (ILAs) and the subsequent introduction of educational maintenance allowances (EMAs) following the scrapping of the former. Although similar in many respects, the first was a major failure while the second, having learned the lessons of the first, was acclaimed as a success. Using a cultural analysis, this case study shows how project‐to‐project learning enabled the EMA project team to learn from the failed project. This resulted in two significant changes in government and civil service organizational culture.     

Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi‐Autonomous Agencies? The Case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France

In recent years, there has been a considerable degree of delegation from governments to quasi‐autonomous agencies. Various reasons have been put forward to explain why governments decide to delegate authority in this way. Some reasons are based on a transaction‐cost approach, such as credible commitments. Other reasons are more contextual. For instance, governments may be responding to a process of cross‐national policy transfer. In the literature on delegation some hypotheses have already been tested. Specifically, evidence has been found suggesting that governments create agencies to commit credibly to particular policy choices. However, other hypotheses, particularly ones based on contextual explanations, have proved much more difficult to operationalize. This article aims to help fill this gap. It does so by focusing on the creation of Independent Administrative Authorities in France. Does the qualitative evidence in this particular case corroborate the quantitative studies that have been undertaken elsewhere?     

In-group solidarity or out-group hostility in response to terrorism in France? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism has a wide-ranging impact on a polity. At the same time, a complementary, yet less extensive body of research discusses the impact of terrorism on the crux of representative democracy, namely its citizens. In contribution to that literature, and to further explore how external shocks affect public opinions, we propose a two-dimensional analytical framework to examine the effects of the November 2015 terrorist events in Paris and Saint Denis. Drawing from extant scholarship, we argue that we can expect both in-group solidarity and out-group hostility to increase in direct response to these events. This study relies on a regression discontinuity design to analyse a representative survey (DREES) that was in the field at the time of the events. Findings are two-fold. First, and perhaps surprisingly, we find no conclusive evidence of increasing out-group hostilities as a direct consequence of the terrorist events. Second, we find a definite strengthening of in-group solidarity indicators following the events. This not only confirms that citizens adjust their opinions in response to environmental stimuli, but also highlights the democratic resilience of citizens, particularly when faced with a collective threat. Altogether, these findings add to our understanding of why and how individual behaviour changes in light of exogenous shocks.     

Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Mysterious Case of the Vanishing Split Bond Rating in States

Bond ratings on state-issued debt provide a signal to credit markets that help them charge an appropriate interest rate, based on the risk of payment default. Though actual default may occur only in extreme circumstances, observed differences in ratings and interest costs across states and time demonstrate that a sound economy, strong financials, and stable policies matter. When data on the factors that presumably affect ratings is public and easily accessible, making sense of differences of opinion between bond rating agencies is difficult. We suggest that such differences—observed as so-called split bond ratings—are often ephemeral. Utilizing a simulation method to uncover the latent credit risk presented by each state, we show that split ratings on state bonds are often due to the fact that presumed category overlap between rating agencies is absent when evaluated on a common latent scale. Most observed state bond rating splits from 1997 through 2006 can be explained by this category mismatch. Our approach has broad implications for pricing state debt, as well as pricing rated debt in other capital market sectors.