Holiday Anomalies

正THE week-long National Day holiday at the beginning of October is a firm favorite among Chinese employees.It is a prime time for them to ask for leave to go traveling or visit relatives in other cities.However,if you are about to write an email to your Chinese boss to ask for 20 days of annual leave to travel somewhere in China,then I really have to stop you right     

Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections

While Euroscepticism is the most important driver of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) support, other attitudinal drivers – namely dissatisfaction towards mainstream parties and xenophobia – are also important. Examining vote‐switching between first‐ and second‐order elections evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent and middle‐class ‘strategic defectors’ from the mainstream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti‐immigration rhetoric and populist anti‐establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected extreme right parties such as the British National Party (BNP). This suggests that UKIP is well positioned to recruit a broader and more enduring base of support than the BNP.     

The Politics of the Strategic Defence and Security Review: Centralisation and Cuts

This article examines the politics of the October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), focussing on the points of difference between the main political parties (and within the Cameron coalition government) and the political dynamics of the review process. In examining how the government's core mission to reduce the country's ‘historic deficit’ impacted on the review process and outcomes, we are also able to highlight the practical results of a political philosophy that is currently being implemented across Whitehall. We argue that defence is a path‐finding policy area for a new kind of post‐industrial bureaucratic environment typified by a ‘thin‐client’ and ‘smart customer’ function that interacts with industry.     

Violence in Juvenile Institutions

This study assesses the impact of selected deprivation and importation variables on inmate violence in four juvenile correctional institutions. While both sets of variables were shown to exert independent effects on inmate aggression, variations in the institutional context mediated the impact of inmate characteristics on levels of p r i s m violence. Preinstitutional violence emerged as the best predictor of inmate aggression, regardless of institutional setting. Race was shown to affect inmate violence directly m l y in the most treatment-oriented facility, while the inmate code was found to exert effects only in the most custodial institution.     

SEX RATIOS AND RAPE RATES: A POWERCONTROL THEORY*

Guttentag and Secord (1983) hypothesize that sex ratios (the number of men per 100 women) affect the roles of both men and women. They suggest that although high sex ratios decrease men 3 dyadic power, when sex ratios are high men use their structural power to control women. Their theory can be combined with the routine activities approach of Cohen and Felson (1979) or with a version of the power-threat/power-competition hypothesis of Blalock (1967) to develop a power-control theory dealing with the relationship between sex ratios and rape rates: i.e., when sex ratios are high, rape rates should be relatively low. Analyses of data from the United States for the years 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987 support this hypothesis.     

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party‐political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative self‐restraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.