The Executive Divided Against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986–1988

From March 1986 to May 1988 France was headed by a leftist President and a rightist Prime Minister. The background to this unusual situation is presented, and the experience itself — referred to as cohabitation — is discussed in detail.
The complex game that the two executive leaders played during the period was regulated by the constitutional rules, conditioned by the electoral calendar and the narrowness of the prime minister's coalition majority, and moderated by public approval and the existence of a bipartisan foreign and defense policy.
The 1986–1988 experience did not overtax the constitutional system, but cohabitation under different conditions could be destabilizing. Cohabitation is like the possibility of the US president being selected by the House of Representatives: not highly probable but possible, not necessarily dangerous but possibly so, and something that arouses little enthusiasm.     

Elements of the Defense Attorney's Craft: An Adaptive Expectations Model of the Preliminary Hearing Decision

The way criminal defense attorneys handle cases prior to final disposition is a subject that has gone largely unexplored by researchers. This study focuses on the decisions of attorneys to waive preliminary examinations in nine felony courts. Employing both interviews and case-level data, analysis of this decision emphasizes the adaptive behavior of attorneys to local court policies, client concerns, tactical issues, and time pressures. Underlying the specific rules of choice guiding this decision are more fundamental concerns of attorneys regarding efficiency, professionalism, and the minimization of later regrets associated with waiving preliminary hearings.     

THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Twenty-five years after it was established in 1967 the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is now criticized not so much on the grounds that it lacks teeth; the problem rather is that the system could be used with advantage a good deal more extensively than it is. The parliamentary Ombudsman has been under-used largely because it has generated only bounded enthusiasm among MPS, the 'gatekeepers' and potential 'magnets' for the office. Survey evidence suggests that MPS' attitudes are related mainly to their dissatisfaction with the limitations on the ombudsman's 'spatial' jurisdiction and the length of time taken by the office to investigate complaints. MPs' disapproval of these aspects of the scheme, however, may be symptomatic of a divergence between members' desire for 'quick-fix' solutions to constituents' problems and the emphasis placed on the 'audit role' of the office by successive commisioners. Greater awareness of the functions of the office by both the general public and among MPS; an extension of the Commissioner's jurisdictional remit; a faster average 'throughput' time for investigations; and possibly the introduction of a two track procedure for inquiries are all arguably required if the full potential of the Parliamentary Commissioner scheme is to be realized.     

Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­