EDUCATION,EDUCATION, EDUCATION: THE THIRD WAY AND PFI

In 1997, New Labour set about the task of reforming public services in the United Kingdom through the use of an ideology that became known as the ‘Third Way’. This research examines the context from which this concept emerged, and explores its relationship with the tools of delivery, with particular reference to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). The paper begins by reviewing the Third Way, before analysing the arguments for and against PFI. Using an example from the Northern Ireland education sector, the paper argues that the characteristics associated with the Third Way are mirrored in the operational tools of public service delivery, such as PFI. The paper concludes that, within the context of the case study reviewed, there is a ‘consistent pragmatism’ in play in relation to how these delivery initiatives are operated and how they relate to their conceptual underpinnings.     

Congressional Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate

Abstract An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.     

A TEST OF THE BLACK SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE THESIS: A RESEARCH NOTE*

We use data from the General Social Survey (1983 to 1991) to test Wolfgang and Ferracuti's hypothesis that violent values are widespread among African-Americans. Contrary to the expectations of the black subculture of violence thesis, our analyses indicate that white males are significantly more likely than blacks to express violent tendencies in defensive situations and that there is no significant difference between white and black males in offensive situations, ceteris paribus. Thus, we have rejected, within the limitations of our data, the hypothesis that a unique subculture of violence exists among the general population of African-Americans in the United States.