Intergovernmental cooperation,regulatory agencies and transportation regulation in Canada: the case of Part III of the National Transportation Act

In the National Transportation Act of 1967, provision was made, by means of Part III of the legislation, for the federal government to regulate directly the extra-provincial motor carrier industry. This section has never been implemented and this article attempts to explain why. Such an explanation, it is argued, is important because of the philosophy of the NTA, the responsibilities given to the Canadian Transport Commission and the inadequacies of the existing provincial regulatory systems. The explanation is to be found in an analysis of two factors whose interrelationship has been given inadequate attention. The first factor is the growing recognition of the need for intergovernmental collaboration in transportation planning and regulation. The second is the role of regulatory bodies in the policy process. The argument is advanced that the conflict over implementation of Part in illustrates a number of problems with respect to the appropriate functions of regulatory agencies, particularly in the context of intergovernmental negotiations. The article concludes with the suggestion for a possible course of action that may be applicable to other policy areas. Sommaire. La partie III de la Loi nationale sur les transports de 1967 prévoyait la régulation directe par le gouvernement fédéral de l'industrie du transport extre-provincial par véhicule moteur. Ces dispositions n'ont jamais été mises en application et le présent article tente d'en expliquer les raisons. Une explication s'impose, en effet, en raison de la philosophie même de la loi, des responsabilités qui incombent à la Commission canadienne des transports et des faiblesses de la règlementation provinciale actuelle. L'auteur attribue cette situation à deux facteurs dont l'interdépendance a été sous-estimée. Le premier est celui de la reconnaissance accrue de la nécessité d'une collaboration intergouvernementale pour la planification et la régulation des transports. Le second est le rôle des organismes de regulation dans l'élaboration de la politique en la matière. On suggère que le conflit touchant la mise en application de la Partie in de la loi fait ressorti un certain nombre de problèmes relatifs à la détermination des functions propres des organismes de régulation, particulièrement dans le contexte des négociations intergou-vemnementales. L'article propose en conclusion une ligne de conduite qui pourrait convenir à d'autres secteurs.     

Schiffe als Abfall?

Zusammenfassung In dem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, ob Seeschiffe in hiesigen H?fen, die demn?chst im Ausland abgewrackt werden sollen, unter das Ausfuhrverbot des Basler übereinkommens und der EG-Abfallverbringungsverordnung fallen. Diese Auffassung wird in Industriel?ndern aufgrund der oftmals hohen Kontamination alter Schiffe mit Giftstoffen und angesichts unzureichender Umweltund Arbeitsschutzbestimmungen in abwrackenden Entwicklungsl?ndern verschiedentlich vertreten. Die Autoren zeigen, dass das geltende Recht Auslaufverbote für solche Schiffe nicht zul?sst und weisen auf die Bemühungen der Internationalen Seeschifffahrts-Organisation um ein Schiffsrecyclingübereinkommen hin.     

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model "Europeanist," Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.