Arbitration and Incentives: How to Preclude the Chilling Effect?

We seek to establish a mechanism for an arbitrator, as a set of rules used to control parties' incentives. We assume that the arbitrator is allowed to commit himself to a decision rule ex ante. The results show that the parties' messages reveal their private information if the costs of lie are high enough and if the decision rule is random. The decision rule described can apply to conventional arbitration and to final-offer arbitration.     

The Influence of Self-Threats on Fairness Judgments and Affective Measures

This paper focuses on the question of why fairness matters to people. Extending on terror and uncertainty management theories and the literature on the self, it is proposed here that fairness can be a means of self-defense. Thinking of a situation that is threatening to the self therefore should make fairness a more important issue to people. The findings of two experiments support this line of reasoning: Asking participants to think about things that are threatening to themselves led to stronger reactions to manipulations of both procedural and distributive fairness. In the discussion it is argued that these findings suggest that fairness especially matters to people when they are trying to deal with threats to their selves.     

Procedural decisions in intergroup conflict situations: The influence of hierarchical group membership

A review of research on procedural and distributive justice shows that whereas distributive justice research has examined people's actual choice of outcomes, procedural justice research has paid little attention to the investigation of people's actual choice of procedures. In the present paper, three experiments are presented, all investigating people's actual choice of procedures. In all three experiments, participants were in a middle-management position where their subordinates demanded an opportunity to voice their opinion, while their superiors demanded that the subordinates should not be allowed voice. In Experiments 1 and 2 it was found that participants who were induced to identify with the low hierarchical group (subordinates) allowed more voice than participants who were induced to identify with the high hierarchical group (superiors), but that the effect of hierarchical group membership was absent when maximizing performance (Experiment 1) or participative values (Experiment 2) were explicitly emphasized. In Experiment 3 it was found that the effect of hierarchical group membership on procedural decision making was also evident in persons who progressed from identifying with both hierarchical groups to identifying with one hierarchical group. In the discussion it is argued that cross-fertilization between the fields of procedural and distributive justice will deepen our understanding of social justice in general.     

How rumors are born

Jean-No?l Kapferer is an internationally recognized expert on rumors. He is professor of communication at l’école des Hautes études Commercialesand at l’Institut Supérieur des Affairesin Paris, and president of the Foundation pour l’étude et l’Information sur les Rumeurs.He is author of numerous books on communication and persuasion. This article has been adapted from his book Rumors, Uses, Interpretation, and Images,published by Transaction.     

Flip-flop rebel,dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo1

The wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have seen the recruitment of flip-flop clad rebels and instability arising because soldiers have not received their salary of a few dollars. Conversely, demobilisation programmes, which bring promises of reintegration grants, have not attracted people to disarm. This paper examines this conundrum alongside three features of the situation in Congo: the informalisation of politics and the economy, the exercise of power through violence, and the multiple crises in which people are living. Drawing on reports on demobilisation and interviews conducted in Congo, the paper investigates what implications these three aspects have for demobilisation, and what is achieved by the programmes as they stand. It argues that demobilisation programmes do not address fighters' motivations, and outcomes are largely immaterial. Instead there is a political pillage—akin to the pillages that took place across Congo in the early 1990s—by which some parties make immediate gains, whilst shaping the conditions for longer term losses and destructive systems.     

Economic development and parental status homogamy: A study of 19th century France

This study investigates the claim that industrialization led to a decrease of parental status homogamy. Contrary to previous research industrialization is not indicated by historical time, nor measured as a macro-development, but instead brides and bridegrooms who are more involved in the industrial labour market are compared with those who are less involved. The theory of preferences, third parties and meeting opportunities is used to derive the hypotheses that young persons (1) with an industrial occupation, (2) who are intergenerationally mobile, and (3) with formal training marry more often outside their parental status group. Hypotheses are tested using the Tra-dataset on France for the period 1803–1899. Brides and bridegrooms working in an industrial occupation and intergenerationally mobile bridegrooms are indeed found to marry less homogamously with respect to parental status.     

Same Game but More Players? Sub-national Lobbying in an Enlarged Union

This contribution builds on the insights provided by the literature on sub-national mobilization in the European Union (EU) to assess whether the 2004–2007 rounds of enlargement have changed anything in this respect. Empirical analysis uses two types of data sources. The first is a survey of over a 100 regional offices in Brussels, and the second consists of 29 semi-structured interviews with Commission officials led in the aftermath of the 2004–2007 enlargements. These data are used to answer the following two research questions: (1) is there a ‘new’ versus ‘old’ cleavage at the territorial level in Brussels? (2) Is there anything like an ‘enlargement effect’ on sub-national mobilization? Analysis reveals that, while there is fading evidence of a ‘new’ versus ‘old’ cleavage in Brussels, enlargement has nevertheless had an impact on sub-national mobilization at the EU level, reinforcing older but also newer trends.