The Arabs in Israel: Identity,criminality and the peace process

The basic datum that criminality among the Palestinian Arabs of Israel is nearly double the average among the population in general begs some hard questions and answers. It is suggested here that, besides the regular crimes endemic in Israeli society of which Arabs and Jews alike partake, there is a category of criminal activity that is peculiar to the Arabs, under the heading of ‘ideological’, namely nationalistically and/or religiously induced. It is suggested here that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians does not necessarily reduce the rate of criminality among Israeli Arabs. Quite the contrary, in some cases it might increase criminal partnerships between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line divide even when the peace process is alive and kicking; and when it is not, things might even get worse with the Israeli Arabs increasingly identifying with their brethren across the border in their struggle against the right‐wing government of Israel from which they are totally alienated.     

Getting the right picture for the wrong reasons: intelligence analysis by Hezbollah and Hamas

This article analyses intelligence assessment as performed by Hezbollah and Hamas and similar Violent Non-State Actors (“VNSA”). VNSA’s seek to inflict the highest level of harm on adversary states without provoking full-scale wars, which they avoid due to military asymmetry. Improved intelligence regarding a state’s cost/benefit analysis of unleashing full-scale war thus enables VNSA’s to “safely” calibrate operations to maximize harm. Such efforts might prove error-prone for three reasons: the authoritarian structure characterizing VNSAs; psychological bias regarding both self and enemy; and a “transparency fallacy” concerning target states. Assessments of Hezbollah (2006) and Hamas (2014) serve as case studies.     

The European Programme for the protection of critical infrastructures – meta-governing a new security problem?

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) constitutes a paradigmatic as well as challenging case for EU security governance, which has received limited academic attention to date. This article draws on a heuristic framework to survey the EU's capacities to ‘meta-govern’, that is, to stimulate and steer governance efforts across multiple sectoral and political divides, in this complex issue area. The main part of the paper assesses the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which comprises a variety of policy instruments and initiatives, on this basis. It is shown that the attempt of an authoritative regulation of European critical infrastructures has remained narrow and of questionable effectiveness. Scientific networks have developed more dynamically, while the participation of private companies and corresponding EU financial instruments are yet to show their potential. Finally, the EU's organizational capacity in CIP suffers from a lack of coordination structures in the European Commission, but also needs to take the scarcely known Joint Research Centre (JRC) into account. The conclusions highlight the barriers to comprehensive governance of as well as large research gaps on European critical infrastructure policies.