How Turnout Depends on the Number of Parties: A Logical Model

We illustrate the power of “logical models” (Taagepera, 2007 Taagepera, Rein (2007) Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems (NewYork: Oxford University Press).[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well.     

Meteoric trajectory: The Res Publica Party in Estonia

Formed in 2001, Res Publica won the Estonian parliamentary elections in 2003, and its leader became prime minister. It failed to win a single seat in the European Parliament in 2004 and was down to 5 per cent in opinion polls in 2005 when it dropped out of the cabinet. The founding chairperson of the party analyses here the causes for Res Publica's rapid rise and fall, reviewing the socio-political background and drawing comparisons with other new parties in Europe. Res Publica was a genuinely new party that involved no previous major players. It might be characterized as a ‘purifying bridge party’ that filled an empty niche at centre right. Its rise was among the fastest in Europe. For success of a new party, each of three factors must be present to an appreciable degree: Prospect of success?=?Members?×?Money?×?Visibility. Res Publica had all three, but rapid success spoiled the party leadership. Their governing style became arrogant and they veered to the right, alienating their centrist core constituency. It no longer mattered for the quality of Estonian politics whether Res Publica faded or survived.     

Supplementing the effective number of parties

The effective number of parties, N=1/Σp²_i (where p_i is the fractional share of the ith party), usually suffices to describe adequately a constellation of parties of different strengths. Difficulties arise when disparity in party sizes is such that the largest share (p₁) surpasses 0.50 (meaning absolute dominance), while N still indicates a multi-party constellation. In such cases N_∞=1/p₁ is proposed as a supplementary indicator: a value less than 2 indicates absolute dominance. An ‘NP' index proposed earlier is a combination of N and N_∞; its values are close to those of N_∞, but NP sometimes falls below 2 even when many parties are relevant for coalition formation. [Reference to Appendix A] offers an alternative approach based on indices of deviation from a norm, but it proves cumbersome.     

Proportional Representation in Scandinavia: Implications for Finland

The comparative study of electoral system requires uniform methods easily applicable to every country's electoral data. In this paper we have presented two such possibilities: a new graphical method that portrays the proportionality profile of a country's electoral rule, and measures to calculate the systematic and random deviation from proportionality. The empirical data consist of election results from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Around 1950, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden changed from the d'Hondt method of allocation to the modified Sainte Lague rule. The consequences of this shift represent the primary focus of this article. What can the present Finnish constitutional reformers learn from the Scandinavian experience? According to the empirical results, three distinct patterns of proportionality profiles can be distinguished: 1) systems involving nationwide adjustment seats, 2) modified St. Lague (without adjustment seats) and 3) d'Hondt (without adjustment seats). The d'Hondt system gives a high advantage ratio to large parties, the modified Sainte Lague method favors middle-size parties, and the adjustment seats system overrides the basic characteristics of both the d'Hondt and modified Sainte Lague methods. The proportionality indices show the modified Sainte Lague to be more proportional than the d'Hondt method. The proportionality of elections is nearly perfect with adjustment seats system irrespective of the method of allocation applied.     

Privacy and security in centralized vs. decentralized databank systems

This paper explores the questions of whether or not a centralized personal-information databank system presents a greater threat to the privacy and other related rights of the persons on whom data are kept than does a decentralized system that collectively holds the same data, and which databank system can provide better data security. It is concluded that, except possibly in the case of a coup d'état, a properly designed and controlled centralized databank system is a smaller threat to privacy and provides more effective security than a decentralized system.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation Grant No. 29943.     

National Representation in International Organizations: The Seat Allocation Model Implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament

What determines the allocation of voting weights to member states in international organizations? What drives the seat and voting weight allocation in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council of the European Union (EU)? Our objective in this article is to develop a universal logical model and to demonstrate that the resulting equation indeed captures negotiated outcomes on seat and voting weight allocations in EU institutions from their beginning. We predict seat and voting weight allocations for both the EP and the Council of the EU within one general model. Hence, we do not employ actual data on seat allocations or voting weights in either the EP or the Council of the EU, but instead, use logical constraints exclusively, as posed by the following elements: the total number of seats/voting weights ( S ), the number of member states ( N ) and, finally, their respective population size ( P_i ). Only our final model selection among several theoretical options is guided by empirical information. With no post hoc parameters used, our model fits both the Council of the EU and the EP rather well, over a time span of nearly 40 years. Inspired by the 'seat–vote equation' ( Taagepera, 1973 ) for seat allocation in national legislatures, the new 'seat–population equation' calculates the number ( S _i) of EP seats or Council voting weights of member state i as follows:     , where n =(1/log  N − 1/log  S )/(1/log  N − 1/log  P ), P being the total population (as summed over all member states). We posit that this equation is applicable to predict outcomes in practice whenever voting weight or seat allocations in international organizations are allocated on the basis of the population shares of their component entities.     

Nationwide inclusion and exclusion thresholds of representation

The theoretical inclusion and exclusion thresholds are, respectively, the vote shares below which a party cannot possibly win a seat, and above which it cannot possibly fail to do so. They are important in evaluating how hospitable electoral systems are to small parties. Previously, they have been calculated at the district level. Here the theory is extended to the national level. Surprisingly, the inclusion threshold depends on the smallest district in the country — not the largest. The exclusion threshold depends on all districts. The theoretical results are compared to empirical observations for 23 electoral systems. The inclusion threshold is indeed close to the minimal vote share that ever led to a seat in the national assembly. In stark contrast, the exclusion threshold is much higher than the maximal vote share that ever failed to produce a seat in practice. The total number of districts emerges as a significant variable.