Promoting Democracy without Starting a New Cold War?

Spread of market economy and promotion of democracy are twincomponents of globalization. Both are generally positive phenomenathat are taken by many to be something as obvious as God, motherhoodand apple-pie. However, there is too much naivety and hypocrisy,especially in the process of promotion of democracy. In thecase of societies that lack elementary preconditions for theintroduction of democracy, the remedy may be worse than theillness. The end of the Cold War did not end the attempts touse concepts, such as democracy and human rights, as ideologicaltools to undermine other States. Attempts to change domesticsocial and political systems, especially those of great powersor their allies and neighbours, may lead to a new era of greatpower confrontation that would be especially dangerous becauseof common threats such as terrorism, spread of weapons of massdestruction, environmental crisis and so on.     

Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy: Logical Connections and Institutional Design

Lijphart's (1999 ) analysis maps countries along two dimensions of democratic institutions: 'executives-parties' or 'joint-power', and 'federal-unitary' or 'divided-power'. My 'meta-study' maps the methodology of Lijphart's mapping: the nature of indices (inputs or outputs), their logical interconnections, their susceptibility to institutional design ('constitutional engineering'), and their suitability for expressing the intended underlying concepts. Strikingly, the joint-power indicators are highly correlated and mostly logically connected output measures, which are not susceptible to institutional design, while the opposite is true for the divided-power dimension. For this dimension most indices are expert estimates of inputs, marginally correlated, yet subject to institutional design, limited by size dependence. Surprisingly, the parliamentary-presidential aspect of institutional design does not affect the picture. The connection between cabinet life and the number of parties is even stronger than found by Lijphart. Interest groups and central bank independence fit his dimensions empirically but less so logically. In sum, institutional design may be more difficult than sometimes assumed, but offers hope.     

Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans Want Divided Government and Vote to Create It

Political Behavior - Tests of theories of the electoral origins of divided government hinge on the proper measurement of voter preferences for divided government. Deriving preferences for divided...     

Seat share distribution of parties: Models and empirical patterns

We find that strategic sequencing and other factors sort parties roughly into two groups. Low-ranking parties lose part of their inherent support, compared to probabilistic expectations, while high-ranking parties profit from the shift. Our method is to graph the worldwide mean seat shares of parties at various ranks by size against the largest party share (Nagayama triangle format). The resulting empirical pattern looks complex, yet when we adjust a probabilistic model to account for strategic and other factors that may hurt the smaller parties, the fit becomes close. The number of parties that profit from transfers is close to the inverse of the fractional share of the largest party. The model fits best when the transfer is assumed to involve about one-half of inherent minor party support. This is a novel way to estimate the universal average strength of strategic and other factors that work against the smaller parties. The empirical worldwide mean pattern offers us a norm against which seat share distributions in individual countries or single elections can be compared.     

Democratisation through the Supply–Demand Prism

The end of the Cold War brought about a new wave of proliferation of market economy and democracy. Both are spreading through purposeful efforts of Western exporters and Eastern importers as well as by way of example. These generally positive processes are not, however, without considerable negative side effects and setbacks. The article considers three pairs of dialectical contradictions: parallel democratization and introduction of free markets, democratization and liberalism, and democratization and nationalism. Naïve, hypocritical, and pragmatic approaches to democracy promotion, as well as factors facilitating or hindering democratization (sometimes making it impossible) of specific societies, are analyzed. One of the central problems is the question of absolute or relative (contingent on time, space, and other factors) universality of democracy. The article concludes that democracy has to be mainly demand-driven, not supply-induced. It also considers to what extent external efforts can compensate for the weaknesses of domestic facilitators and what happens when there are attempts to export democracy to societies that are not ready for that.     

Predicting Party SizesThe 2007 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture

The Skytte Foundation states that I was awarded the Skytte Prize 2008 for ‘profound analysis of the function of electoral systems in representative democracy’. What does this mean? As examples, I would highlight three relationships that qualify as laws in the strongest scientific sense. They do so because they offer a logically supported model as well as agreement with data, which gives them broad predictive ability.