Swings and gerrymanders

It is usual for electoral analysts to calculate the swing necessary at the next election to unseat a government, assuming that the swing is a uniform one. However, swings are not uniform. The non-uniform swing which would, on average, unseat a government is shown to be different from the uniform swing. For example, at the next Australian election for the House of Representatives, a uniform swing of 1.5 per cent against the current government would cause it to lose five seats, leaving it in a minority of 73 out of 148 seats, but a non-uniform swing of only 0.8 per cent would, on average, have the same effect. Implications of this variability for the size of the majority, the possibilities of a Parliament with an even number of seats being equally-divided, and the use of this analysis to detect gerrymandering and to correct for it, are considered.     

After the cold war

He is co-editor (with Kenneth W. Thompson) of Truth and Tragedy: A Festschrift for Hans J. Morgenthau,and editor of The Political Morality of the IMF.He is currently writing a book on Understanding Ethics.     

Problems of co-ordination in upazila administration in Bangladesh

The present government of Bangladesh has extensively reformed the administrative system and upgraded the previous thana to upazila (sub-district) to serve as the focal point of development administration. A new tier of local government called Upazila Parishad (UZP) has been created and a large number of functions have been devolved to this institution along with the placement of central government employees at its disposal. The reformers argue that the present system will remove the inadequacies of the previous administrative system and will bring about an improvement in the co-ordination of field services at the upazila level. However, the actual situation represents a totally different picture. The desired integration— both vertical and horizontal—and co-ordination in local level planning is non-existent due to the absence of any clear direction from the central government. Proper co-ordination among the field services in the upazila administration does not exist due to the anomalous relation between the upazila and the national government, including excessive central control; the involvement of multiple agencies of the central government in guiding and supervising; ambiguity in government thinking; the absence of clarification from the ministries concerned and agencies on the timing of different development programmes; and conflict over the allocation of resources. There is also conflict between the different tiers of local government in respect of authority and resources. Relations between public representatives and officials at the upazila level are strained because a clear allocation of authority to political executives is lacking; areas for co-operation among different agencies have not been clarified; and public representatives and government officials lack mutual respect.     

Political fragmentation of the Dutch Windward Islands

The Dutch Windward Islands are examined to see if they throw any light on the problems experienced when very small island communities try to come together to form a larger political unit. The Constitution of 1954, though federal in intent, was unitary in practice, with the main island, Curacao treating the others like municipalities. However the island authorities are capable of asserting themselves against the centre. They control implementation, raise revenue and receive local political support. Because of the small size of the populations and civil services involved, island and federal officials collaborate harmoniously. Leading individuals are important for development, notably St Maarten's Claude Wathey. New initiatives also require effective negotiations to deal with off-shore tourist organizations. However, there is little significant industry beyond tourism. In 1988 the three Dutch Windward Islands agreed to co-operate with each other. Decentralization within the largest island could help this cooperation as could a regional association along the lines of the South Pacific Forum.     

The Budget Enforcement Act in 1991: Isometric Budgeting

The immediate effect of the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was to cancel a pending $110 billion sequester and to change the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets. These and other changes allowed Congress and the administration to escape responsibility for increases in the deficit if discretionary spending was kept within the caps and no new entitlement programs or revenue enhancements were added. This assumption and others relating to the empowerment of the Appropriations Committees and the new authority of the OMB are explored in this article.     

Virginia's Revenue Forecasting Process and Models

In Virginia, major differences between revenue forecasts and actual revenue collections raised questions from legislators about the adequacy of the state's econometric forecasting models and the forecasting process itself. Consequently, Virginia's process and models were examined by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC), a legislative watchdog agency. The review found most of the differences could be attributed to declining economic factors and not poor forecasting. However, a surprisingly large component of the forecast was based on undocumented judgmental inputs that required greater oversight. Other states in similar circumstances may wish to evaluate their own forecasting process and econometric models using the JLARC approach.