Empathic emotions and justice in society

Empathy is defined as an affect more appropriate to another's situation than to one's own. The paper (i) summarizes different modes of empathic affect arousal; (ii) shows how empathic affect may interact with social-cognitive development, to produce four levels of empathy development; (iii) suggests that causal attributions may transform empathic affect into sympathy, guilt, and empathic anger, which are major moral affects; (iv) discusses how these affects may influence moral judgment and behavior; (v) points up empathic morality's limitations and the need to embed empathy in relevant moral principles; (vi) discusses possible links between empathy and justice principles, with special focus on Rawls; (vii) illustrates the interplay of empathy, moral judgment, and justice; and (viii) suggests that moral principles may become hot cognitions.     

对《中华人民共和国法律汇编:1979—1986》的反思

<正> 在1987年8月24日的《北京周报》上,我第一次谈到的有关中国立法文选的一个短评。几个月后,在中国首都,我起初拟买两卷中国法律汇编。遗憾的是,在我所光顾的书店里,所有能买到的只有英译的刑法和刑事诉讼法,以及若干有关国家外资经济之立法的译本。据悉,我所要买的那两个版本,很快便销售一空。只是到了后来,通过一位在人大常委会秘书处工作的好心年青人,我才终于搞到那套书。这个两卷本的法律汇编共有约800页,外国人对之有兴趣是可以理解的。它提供了120多个当今中国有效的法规英译名。这个版本是"法制委员会     

New voices from the ship of fools

Conventional left accounts of Thatcherism have stressed the authoritarian nature of its political rhetoric. This paper suggests that convergences between the new conservatism and more fundamentalist moral positions, meeting on the ground of obscenity and violence in the media, are a relatively recent development, associated with renewed strategic concentration on the question of law and order. Indeed, the libertarian right, in adhering to a utilitarian laissez-faire understanding of private pleasures, has presided over a positive proliferation of erotic and other gratifications. We argue that in the United Kingdom the authentic constituency of the moral right is an increasingly socially marginal one, rendered progressively more so by the rapid development of technologies of communication and entertainment.     

Morgentaler v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Morgentaler v. R., the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code. In a five to two split, a majority of the Supreme Court judges found that section 251 offended a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of her "life, liberty, and security of the person." Sheilah Martin reviews the three majority judgments and focuses on the decision written by Madame Justice Wilson. She believes that Madame Justice Wilson's opinion merits special attention in several regards: her conclusions on the constitutional rights of pregnant women; her recognition and validation of women's perspectives on abortion; and her approach to balancing women's interests in reproductive self-determination against the state's interest in regulating reproduction. Sheilah Martin concludes that this decision will reverberate far into the future. Even though it fails to establish clear guidelines concerning governmental power to control access to abortion, its principles outline the legal framework in which future litigation will occur, and it will limit and shape the terms of any ensuing political debate. In addition, Madame Justice Wilson's judgment holds great promise for those looking to the Court to promote the rights of women and other historically disadvantaged groups.