Assessing the impact of decentralization on governance: A comparative methodological approach and application to Tunisia

The relationship between decentralization and governance has not been adequately explored in the literature. Many past studies have failed to assess fully the impact of decentralization because of the lack of a set of independent, comparative indicators of the quality of decentralization being implemented in a given country. The authors adopt the working hypothesis that decentralization, both as a process and as an end state in terms of organization and operations, is closely related to the quality of governance in developing countries. In order to provide an empirical basis for a comparative assessment, the authors have developed a model based on the scope, intensity and commitment to decentralization in a country. Each of these concepts is operationalized in terms of a set of empirically measurable variables. The method is then applied to the case of Tunisia and assessed as a tool for the comparative study of decentralization and governance. Decentralization in Tunisia is shown to have an important relationship to the quality of governance in that country. The methodology developed here for the analysis of the quality of decentralization appears, based on the examination of a significant case, to be worth pursuing cross-nationally.     

Federal-provincial taxation in turbulent times

Abstract: Major changes in federal tax policy over the last decade have added to the pressures on provincial public finances and resulted in increased interest in possible ways to restructure Canada's federal finances by reassigning taxes. I review several recent proposals along these lines, but conclude that on the whole major reassignments of taxes seem unlikely to occur in the near future. The most important immediate issue concerns the possible revision of the much-criticized federal sales tax, the GST. Although major substantive (as opposed to cosmetic) changes in this tax seem either undesirable or unlikely, or both, some further, albeit still imperfect, rapprochement with provincial sales taxes may occur. Finally, I note that both the complexity and the importance of fiscal issues demand, but seldom receive, informed public discussion beyond the passing battles of current federal-provincial political relations. Sommaire: Les importants changements dans les politiques d'imposition fédérales au cours de la dernière décennie sont venus ajouter aux pressions qui s'exercent sur les finances publiques provinciales; on s'intéresse done de plus en plus aux moyens qui permettraient de restructurer les finances fédérales du Canada en réaffectant les impôts. L'article passe en revue plusieurs propositions récentes en ce sens, mais conclut que, dans l'ensemble, il est peu probable que des réaffectations d'impôts se produisent bientôt. La question immédiate la plus importante a trait à la révision possible de la taxe de vente fédérale très critiquée qu'est la TPS. Bien que d'importants changements substantifs (et non pas seulement cosmétiques) dans cette taxe semblent indésirables, ou improbables, ou les deux, un certain rapprochement supplémentaire, mais encore imparfait, risque de se produire avec les taxes de vente provinciales. Enfin, la complexité et l'importance des questions fiscales exigent un débat public ouvert, au-delà des accrochages actuels dans les relations politiques fédérales-provinciales, ce qui demeure rare.     

From occupational involvement to political participation: An exploratory analysis

Since Mill and Tocqueville, theorists have speculated that local participation, particularly involvement in workplace decision making, contributes to participation in wider politics. Theory suggests there should be two types of relationships between work and politics. First, there should be a correspondence between similarly formal or authoritative occupational and political involvements. Second, occupational participation should generate political participation. Thus, both authority patterns and actual participation connect work to politics.This paper hypothesizes that, other things being equal, occupational involvement, such as authority and participation at work, generates wider political participation, and that this influence occurs most strongly across levels of similar formality between the occupational and political spheres. The study finds that work participation, in fact, generates political participation, and that the connection is strongest along a hierarchy of formality connecting participation from the workplace to politics.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Panel on Innovations in the 1985 National Election Study Pilot Survey, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 1986.     

How people with disabilities fare when public policies change

Changes in public policy and in macroeconomic conditions have dramatically affected the economic well-being of people with disabilities over the past two decades, both absolutely and relative to people without disabilities. Using data from the Current Population Survey (1968–1988), we find that the households of white or well-educated males with disabilities have fully recovered from the program cuts and recession of the early 1980s. However, much of this recovery was due to additional earnings by other household members. The households of males who are “doubly handicapped”—nonwhite or poorly educated males with disabilities—have not recovered. We conclude that the new mandates on business aimed at integrating people with disabilities into the workplace are not likely to significantly benefit the doubly handicapped.     

Policy monitoring and policy analysis

In this article we introduce a policy analytic technique that we call “policy monitoring.” Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency's Hazardous Waste Division, we demonstrate how the technique can be employed in actual practice. The case study demonstrates that EPA enforcements were responsive to stimuli emanating from outside the agency. In particular, relevant congressional committees were able to influence and effect change in the EPA's policy. In addition to demonstrating how policy monitoring can be employed, we also discuss how it can be used in other policy analytic situations.     

The political economy of sugar legislation

The findings of this paper are a rather straightforward account of the political economy of senatorial voting on the sugar program. In the spirit of Stigler and Peltzman's accounts of interest group activity, voting on sugar is indeed related to the concentration of economic interests in the Senators' states. States with high concentrations of sugar growers and processing tend to vote for the program, those with high concentration of users tend to vote against it. The emergence of corn syrup as a sugar substitute and its subsequent interests in the program further supports this perspective. These concentrated interests are associated with conditions ripe for overcoming the collective action problem and, we infer, use their organizations to influence senatorial behavior. The political variables suggest countervailing forces which can be interpreted, at least in part, as further examples of organized (here, politically organized) influences on the interests of Senators. Thus, while the model is one of opposing interests, those of producers and users tend to influence different Senators. The major group-interest trade-off, then, is between the pull of organized interests in the constituency with that of party organization at the national (or national institutional level), at least for those for whom the pull is in opposite directions.It is clear, then, that variables representing (concentrated) consumer interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests as well as variables representing grower and processor interests are significant in determining voting patterns on sugar legislation in the Senate. This model, therefore, is not one in which one-sided organizational interests operate politically uncontested. That, even so, consumer interests are not powerful enough to prevent sugar programs from passing is clear at one level, due to the existence of the program over most of this period. The existing level of the transfers from consumers to producers and of deadweight losses must be reflective of the magnitude of their respective free rider problems. Yet voting on the program to renew or alter those benefits at any level clearly reflects these interests and their interplay.